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INTRODUCTION
With its recent adoption of Rule 144A1 and Regulation S,2 the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has attempted to
substantially increase the liquidity of United States private
secondary trading markets and to respond positively to the
internationalization of financial markets The impetus behind these
* B.A. 1969, M.A., 1971, J.D., 1975. University of Maryland; LL.M. 1991 Georgetown
University. The author was formerly a senior business analyst with the Federal National Mortgage
Association, Washington, D.C. The views expressed in this article are the author's, and do not
necessarily reflect those of the association. The article is a revised version of a paper previously
prepared by the author in conjunction with his master of laws degree.
The author would like to express his appreciation to Sheri Shuteroff for her word processing
services.
1. See infra notes 100-170 and accompanying text (discussing Rule 144A).
2. See infra notes 171-257 and accompanying text (discussing Regulation S).
3. Internationalization or, alternatively, globalization, refers generally to the growing market
for cross-border securities offerings and investments. The term encompasses the following activities:
Cross-listing of securities issued in one country on the exchange of another country; trading in
foreign securities through foreign brokers; opening a country's securities market to foreign brokers
and dealers who service both foreigners and nationals; forming contractual or other legal relationships
between exchanges in different countries; 24-hour trading, involving shifting control of trading to
associates in other countries and time zones; trading in multinational securities offerings; investing
in international mutual funds; and selling and purchasing cross-national stock index derivative
instruments. UN1TED STATES CONG., OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY AsSESsMENT, Trading Around The
Clock: Global Securities Markets And Information Technology -- Background Paper,
OTA-BP-C1T-66, at 29-35 (July 1990) [hereinafter OTA Paper].
Factors responsible for globalization include the following: Reduced communications costs
stemming from advances in information systems technology; increasing world trade and
interdependence of national economies; foreign financing of government budgets; dominant presence
of institutional investors intent on diversifying portfolios and hedging risks; financial market
deregulation; and growth in the number of offshore securities issues. Id. at 25-28.
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measures is an increasing willingness on the SEC's part to allow
certain classes of investors to fend for themselves by limiting the
domestic and extraterritorial application of disclosure-oriented U.S.
securities statutes and regulations. Underlying the SEC's stance is
a growing sensitivity to the cost of regulation insofar as regulation
Obstacles to further globalization include the following: Absence of liquidity in smaller markets;
government policies discouraging foreign participation in national markets; exchange controls; the
structure of the relationship between the banking and securities industries; differing procedures for
clearance and settlement; informal government-sanctioned trade barriers; differences in corporate
organization; and variations in capital adequacy standards, accounting practices, and regulatory
regimes. Id. at 28-29. Under one view, conflicting regulatory regimes may be the most significant
impediment to global market integration. See Warren, Global Harmonization of Securities Laws: The
Achievements of the European Communities, 31 HAv. INT'L LJ. 185, 186 (1990) (stating that
"regulatory disharmony" may be the major barrier to market integration); Note, Barriers to the
International Flow of Capital: The Facilitation of Multinational Securities Offerings, 20 VAND. J.
TRANsNAT'L L. 81, 84 (1987) (asserting that variations among nation-states' securities regimes are
perhaps the greatest hindrance to capital market intemationalization). See also Mahoney, Regulation
of International Securities Issues, REG. CATO. REV. OF Bus. & GOV'T 62, 63 (Spring 1991) (stating
that U.S. securities laws are "one of the most vexing" obstacles to international investment
diversification); Perell, Kiernan & Sommer, Regulation S and Rule 144A: A Non-U.S. Issuer's
Perspective, INT'L FIN. L. REV., at 13, 14 (Supp. Sept. 1990) (arguing that U.S. securities laws are
the principal barrier to U.S. investors seeking to diversify portfolios and a cause of erosion of the
preeminence of U.S. capital markets). But see French & Poterba, Investor Diversification and
International Equity Markets, 81 AM. ECON. REv. 222, 224 (May 1991) (noting that portfolio
patterns indicate investors belief that returns on domestic equity will be substantially higher than
returns in foreign markets; asserting that "incomplete," or "underdiversification" of equity holdings
may be attributable to investor choice based on perceived risk differentials rather than variations
among "national institutional constraints"). For additional discussion regarding internationalization,
see generally U.S. GEN. Acr. OFFIcE, REPORT ON INT'L SEC. MARKETS (Apr. 14, 1989) (citing
development of capital adequacy regulations, clearance and settlement procedures, and necessity for
U.S. regulators to "coordinate" U.S. approach to international securities regulation as foremost
challenges to internationalization); STAFF OF SEC., REPORT TO SENATE COMM. ON BANKINO,
HousING, AND URBAN AFFAiRS AND HousE COMM. ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE (July 27, 1987)
(identifying, inter alia, regulatory policy issues raised by market globalization) [hereinafter SEC
STUDY]; Policy Statement on the Regulation of International Securities Markets, Int'l Series Release
No. 1, [1988 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 84,341 (Nov. 23, 1988) (outlining goals
of global market system and identifying regulatory issues posed by internationalization of securities
markets; citing "harmonization" of international securities regulation as a central principle); Cox &
Michael, The Market For Markets: Development of International Securities and Commodities
Trading, 36 CATH. U.L REV. 833 (1987) (reviewing the economics underlying development of
securities markets and market linkages); Grundfest, Internationalization Of The World's Securities
Markets: Economic Causes And Regulatory Consequences, 4 J. FiN. SERVICES RES. 349 (1990)
(discussing dual challenges of internationalization of securities markets: identifying and acting
collectively in areas where cooperation may be beneficial, e.g., coordinating registration and
accounting requirements; and avoiding harmonization of regulatory regimes where competition may
be preferable).
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affects the cost of capital,4 and thereby, the competitive position
of U.S. issuers and securities markets relative to their foreign
counterparts.'
4. A firm's cost of capital is central to the decision to undertake a project. Cost of capital
is defined as that level of real pre-tax rate of return which meets the firm's after-tax cost of funds
and tax obligations. McCauley & Zimmer, Explaining International Differences in the Cost of
Capital, FRBNY Q. REv., Summer 1989, at 7, 24-25. Cost of capital is satisfied when revenues
meet the cost of equity, weighted by its proportion of the firm's capital; the effective cost of debt,
similarly weighted; and income taxes, net of tax credits, and depreciation, discounted by the firm's
after-tax cost of funds. Id at 15. See generally Blackwell & Kidwell, An Investigation of Cost
Differences Between Public Sales and Private Placements of Debt, 22 . FIN. ECON. 253 (1988).
Based on a study of public utilities' market choice decisions with respect to raising debt, the authors
conclude that market selection is determined by which method - public offering or private placement
- results in the lowest transaction costs. Id at 273.
5. See McCauley & Zimmer, supra note 4, at 7,24-25 (explaining that U.S. and U.K. firms'
higher cost of capital than Japanese and German firms' attributable to differences in savings rates,
industrial policy, and close relationship between banks and industry). Cf. Ando & Auerbach, The Cost
of Capital in Japan: Recent Evidence and Further Results, 4 J. JAPANESE & INT'L ECON. 323, 324-25
(1990) (stating that lower cost of capital in Japan explained in part by extraordinary growth of
Japanese land values and relatively high degree of equity cross-ownership among Japanese firms);
Grundfest, Subordination of American Capital, 27 J. FIN. ECON. 89, 99 (1990) (observing that
differences in burdens imposed by respective regulatory systems may account for portion of "large"
U.S.-Japan cost of capital disparities; discussing generally "political agency problems" of how
legislative and corporate management interests act as constraining influences on potential changes
in U.S. capital market regulation aimed at cost of capital reduction and increased institutional investor
monitoring of management); Poterba, Comparing the Cost of Capital in the United States and Japan:
A Survey of Methods, FRBNY Q. REv., Winter 1991, at 20,30 (differential in cost of equity in U.S.
and Japan is "single most important explanation" for evident cost of capital differences). But cf
Frankel, The Japanese Cost of Finance: A Survey, 20 FIN. MOMT. 95, 123-24 (Spring 1991)
(asserting that increases in real interest rates and decline of stock market in Japan in 1990 resulted
in Japanese cost of capital being "approximately" equal to U.S. cost). In addition to variations in
savings rates, differences in industrial organization and the existence of national industrial policy
permit Japanese and German fimns to reduce their cost of capital below that of U.S. and U.K. firms
through greater use of lower risk debt. See McCauley & Zimmer, supra note 4, at 7.
The efficacy of "industrial policy" and whether or to what extent such a policy should be
adopted by the U.S. has been a matter of considerable controversy. Part of the disagreement stems
from the lack of consensus on the meaning of the term. Compare C. PRnsT wrrz, T rING PLACES:
How WE ALLowno JAPAN TO TAKE THE LEAD (1988) and R. RETcu, TALES OF A NEW AMERICA
(1987) and L TwROw, TA-m ZERo-SuM SOLUTON (1985) (all sources favoring adoption of various
forms of industrial policy) with THE PoLrIcs oF INDusTnRAL PoucY (C. Barfield & W. Schambra
eds. 1986) (discussing political aspects of industrial policy in critical terms) andR. LAWRENCE, CAN
AMERIcA COMP'L? (1984) and Schultz, IndustrialPolicy: A Dissent, BROOKINOS REv. 3 (Fall 1983)
(both sources arguing that proponents misconceive government's role and its ability to successfully
devise and implement policy).
Government policy which seeks to promote competitiveness must be informed by a realistic
assessment of the new meaning global economic integration has given to the term "national
competitiveness." Reich, Who Is Us?, 68 HARv. Bus. REv. 53 (Jan./Feb. 1990) (asserting quality of
U.S. workforce - not necessarily U.S. owned and based corporations - is basis of American
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Historically, U.S. securities markets have been recognized as
the world's most innovative. One example of the financial products
which have given rise to such reputation is the asset-backed
security (ABS). 6 Securitization7 of financial assets began in 1970
with the Government National Mortgage Association guaranteed
pass-through certificate, the "Ginnie Mae."'  Since then,
automobile loans, credit card receivables, and a host of other assets
have been packaged as securities and sold by the private sector.'
Theoretically, any source of cash flow can be securitized and
traded in the form of a security. However, there are practical
difficulties associated with securitizing assets such as commercial
mortgages, which stem from their lack of standard features and
special risk characteristics.1" The fact that such assets are
generally the subject of negotiated agreements makes it difficult to
create homogeneous securities comprised of instruments with
similar contractual rights and cash flow characteristics.11 Despite
such obstacles, 2 the demand for lower cost, more flexible sources
of financing, in conjunction with the development of increasingly
sophisticated computer modeling techniques and database
management systems, resulted in a burgeoning growth of the
of U.S. workforce - not necessarily U.S. owned and based corporations - is basis of American
competitiveness).
6. See infra notes 19-68 and accompanying text (discussing asset-backed securities).
7. "Securitization" or, alternatively, "structured financing,' is the process by which cash
flows from debt instruments or receivables are combined in a single pool. See infra notes 19-42
and accompanying text (describing process of securitization). The combined cash stream is then
allocated among, and used to fund payments on, newly created securities in accordance with
specified (principal and interest) payment schedules. Id
S. The Government National Mortgage Association (GNMA) is a unit of the U.S.
Department of Housing and Urban Development. 12 U.S.C. § 1717(a)(2) (1988). Mortgage
backed securities which are issued by private firms but guaranteed as to principal and interest by
the Association are referred to as "Ginnie Maes." See infra note 23 and accompanying text
(discussing introduction of GNMA securities).
9. See infra notes 69-97 (market for non-real estate and real estate related ABSs).
10. See infra note 12 (Shenker & Colletta - a discussion of commercial mortgage
securitzation).
11. 1d
12. See Shenker & Colletta, Asset Securitization: Evolution, Current Issues and New
Frontiers in Symposium-New Financial Products, The Modern Process of Financial Innovations,
and the Law, 69 Tx. L. RE . 1369, 1396-1403 (1991) (describing initial, creative use of
securitization to finance commercial real estate through capital markets, rather than in traditional
mortgage lending market).
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wide volume of $93.8 billion in 1986, the market reached $158
billion in 1989 and is projected to increase to $175.5 billion in
1990, a rise of eleven percent.
13
This Article explores the potential impact of Rule 144A and
Regulation S on the nature of, and markets for, asset-backed
securities. Parts I and II outline ABS structures and trading
markets. 14 Part II reviews the principal elements of Rule 144A
and certain related regulatory developments." Part IV describes
Regulation S.16 Part V considers some of the potential effects of
these new regulations on ABS secondary market trading.' 7 The
Article concludes that securitization in the Rule 144A and
Regulation S environment may result in financial fraud which will
act as one of the catalysts in the forthcoming reassessment of the
bases of U.S. securities laws in the era of global markets."i
As Rule 144A and Regulation S begin to be utilized, they may
be viewed as welcome, if overdue, developments for issuers and
investors alike in the movement toward deregulation and increased
capital and trading market efficiencies. Despite this Article's
conjectures, firm conclusions about the overall efficacy of Rule
144A and Regulation S, and their effects on ABS markets in
particular, await experience and empirical study.
I. ASSET-BACKED SECURrITES
A. Background
Securitization, also referred to as structured financing, involves
pooling homogeneous groups of assets and using the combined
cash flow to fund payments on various types of securities which
13. MOODY'S INVESTOR SERVICES, INC., STRUCTURED FINANCE: ANNUAL REPORT 1989
REVIEW AND 1990 OUTLOOK, Jan. 1990, at 5 [hereinafter MOODY'S ANNUAL REPORT]. Moody's
anticipates that the Structured Finance: Annual Report 1990 Review and 1991 Outlook will be
released during the second quarter of 1991.
14. See infra notes 19-99 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 100-170 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 171-257 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 258-349 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 350-360 and accompanying text.
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are sold to investors.19 The process of securitization involves
structuring the security with the emphasis on tax and accounting
considerations, assessment of credit risk and agency ratings,
financing strategy, and tracking, reporting and servicing support.2"
Securitization can be seen as an outgrowth of the commercial paper
market which developed as corporate borrowers sought lower cost,
19. See, e.g., K. LORE, MORTGAGE-BACKED SECURITIES, DEVELOPMENTS AND TRENDS IN
THE SECONDARY MORTGAGE MARKET § 1, at 3-6 (1991 ed.); C. PAVEL, SECURrrIZATION: Tim ASSET
ANALYSIS AND DEVELOPMENT OF LOAN-BASED ASSEr-BACKED SECURITIES MARKETS 1 (1989);
Asset Finance Group, The First Boston Corp., Overview of Assets and Structures, THE AssET
SECURmZATION HANDBOOK 21, at 35-36 (P. Zweig ed. 1989) [hereinafter Asset Finance Group, The
First Boston Corp.]; Barmat, Securitization: An Overview, THE HANDBOOK OF ASSET-BACKED
SECURITIES 3, at 4 (1. Lederman edl. 1990) [hereinafter Barmat]; Boeio & Edwards, Asset
Securitization: A Supervisory Perspective, 75 FED. REs. BULL. 659, at 659-61 (Oct. 1989).
Securitization has been described as a type of financial intermediation that involves, on a
general level, the purchase and sale of financial claims. Cumming, The Economics of Securitization,
FRBNY Q. REv., Autumn 1987, at 11-12. In contrast to traditional financial intermediation,
securitization attempts to match borrowers and savers through recourse to the financial markets. l
This is done by issuance of bonds, commercial paper and asset-backed securities. lId Although
financial intermediaries originate debt, the financial markets are used to place the debt with ultimate
holder-investors. Il A further distinction relates to disintermediation, which involves displacement
of banks and thrifts from traditional lending by other businesses, or direct lending between firms in
the same economic sector, e.g., trade credit, as opposed to financial market transactions. Id. Unlike
disintermediation, securitization entails a permanent change in the forms of claims and types of claim
holders. Id However, both securitization and disintermediation involve a shift away from
intennediation by depository institutions. Id. Compare, e.g., Shenker & Colletta, supra note 12, at
1373-80 (noting that the term "securitization" has no distinct legal meaning; stating that no uniform,
satisfactory definition of securitization exists; describing various uses of the term; and defining
securitization as the sale of equity or debt instruments representing ownership interests in an income
stremn from an asset or pool of assets, in a manner which reallocates underlying risks and which, in
effect, increases the marketability of the underlying assets), with T. FRANKEL, SECURITtZATION:
STRUCTURAL FINANCE, FINANCIAL ASSET PoOLS AND ASSET-BACKED SECURrrIES at xlvi, § 5 at 172-
73 (1991) (securitization "seems to lack legal infrastructures") and id. § 1.2 at 6-7 (securitization
may involve "'substitution of securities for loans," the sale of portions of large loans lmown as "loan
participants," and the sale of securities (i.e. ownership interests) in an asset pool, which securities
are traded in a secondary market through financial intermediaries).
20. Barmat, supra note 19, at 6-14. See Shenker & Colletta, supra note 12, at 1376-80
(securitization process involves asset selection, segregation, equity (pass-through instruments) or debt
(pay-through or asset-backed bond structures) choice, and risk and resale considerations); Koflowitz,
Making the Right Mortgage-Backed Securities Software Moves, 7 WALL STREET J. COMPUTER REV.
at 32 (discussing requirements of ABS issuers and investors relative to limitations of currently
available software). See generally L KARCHER, PROCESSING MORTGAGE-BACKED SECURITIES (1989)
(describing, inter alia, ABS operations processing cycle and clearance procedures).
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more flexible financing alternatives to traditional bank loans."
The roots of securitization also lie in the federal policy of
increasing the supply of residential mortgage credit by stimulating
the development of the secondary mortgage market.' This policy
objective has been pursued since the creation of the Federal
National Mortgage Association (FNMA) in 1938, and more
recently, through the establishment of the Government National
Mortgage Association (GNMA) in 1968, and the Federal Home
Loan Mortgage Corporation (FHLMC) in 1970.' By accelerating
the process of disintermediation, securitization has been a
significant force in restructuring the financial services industry.24
Several factors have been driving structured finance. From the
commercial lender's perspective, securitized debt frequently has a
lower total cost than whole loans. For example, it has been
estimated that the issuance and administrative costs associated with
collateralized mortgage obligations (CMOs),"5  average
21. J. RosENTHAL & J. OCAMPO, SECuRZATION OF CREDiI INSIDE THE NEw T)ECHNOLOGY
OF FINANCE 40 (1988); Acheson & Halstead, Trends in Securitization - Private and Public, 6
CONTRNENTAL BANK J. OF APPLIED CORP. FIN. 52,53-54 (Fall 1988). Securitization's origins can be
traced back to the 19th century and beyond in the form of mortgage-backed bonds, and mortgage
participation certificates. Shenker & Colletta, supra note 12, at 1380-82. See T. FRANKEL, supra note
19, § 2.1 at p. 29.
22. LORE, supra note 19, § 1 at 19-23, 27-31, 69-71.
23. Id. § 2 at 1-46. In 1970, the ONMA began guaranteeing securities (pass-through
certificates) collateralized by pools of mortgages created by private originators. l § 2 at 19-25, 39-
42. GNMA securities (-Ginnie Maes") are technically issued by these originators. Id. The FNMA
and FHLMC provide liquidity to the secondary mortgage market by purchasing conventional, VA,
and FHA loans. Id. The FNMA and FHLMC issue pass-through securities similar to Ginnie Maes:
mortgage-backed securities (MBSs) and collateralized mortgage obligations (CMOs), respectively.
See infra note 25 (defining CMO). The FNMA and FHLMC are Congressionally-chartered
corporations, Ownership of the organizations, which are variously referred to as government
sponsored enterprises (GSEs) or government-related agencies, was transferred to private shareholders
in 1968 (FNMA) and 1989 (FHLMC). See LORE, supra note 19, § 2 at 10-13, 16-20. Since non-real
estate-related securities developed out of MBS and CMO structures and because the MBS and CMO
markets are orders of magnitude larger than the non-real estate-related markets, a distinction is
usually drawn between MBSs/CMOs and asset-backed securities (ABSs). For ease of exposition in
this Article, the term ABS will be used generally to refer to MBSs, CMOs, and non-real estate-related
asset-backed securities unless otherwise indicated.
24. Cumming, The Economics of Securitization, 12 FRBNY Q. REV., at 13-14,21-23; Shenker
& Colletta, iupra note 12, at 1389-92.
25. A collateralized mortgage obligation (CMO) is a bond secured by a mortgage pool. That
portion of cash flow from the pool which represents repayments of principal is paid out sequentially
into one or more classes (tranches) of the bonds. Interest is generally paid currently or accrues on
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approximately twenty-five basis points annually for the duration of
the bond.26 A comparable bank-held residential mortgage portfolio
"has intermediary costs, such as equity costs, income taxes, reserves,
and insurance, of approximately one hundred-fifty basis points.27
Debt which has been securitized is made more liquid: it may be
valued and transferred more efficiently in secondary markets than
individual loans or loan participations.2" Such debt also has the
advantage of being diversified because it represents a pool of loans,
the repayment of which depends on the performance of many
borrowers.29 Securitization unbundles the credit and interest rate
risks associated with traditional debt and, by restructuring the debt,
more efficiently allocates these risks among those willing and able
to bear it.30
With respect to the entities which initially owned the assets
(originators), the sale of the assets to vehicles created for the
purpose of issuing securities collateralized by the assets removes
the assets from the originators' balance sheets'.3  The ability to
remove assets is particularly attractive to depository institutions
because the amount of equity capital required to support balance
sheet assets is thereby reduced, and the resulting increase in
available capital permits expansion and diversification, as well as
the respective outstanding balances of all tranches. Glossary, THE AssE" SEcURmzAION
HANDBOOK, supra note 19, at 558. Each bond class has a specified maturity and coupon date.
Boemio & Edwards, supra note 19, at 662. See infra notes 56-60 and accompanying text (discussing
CMOs).
26. Bryan, Introduction to THE Ass~r SECURMZATION HANDBOOK, supra note 19, at 11.
27. ld. See L. BRYAN, BREAKING UP THE BANK: RETHINKINo AN INDUSTRY UNDER SIEoE
82-84 (1988) (stating that bank subsidiaries of holding companies rated single-A or less have saved
approximately 1.5% in direct financing costs by securitizing loans, e.g., credit card receivables, in
comparison with direct issue costs); Kopff & Lent, Management Challenges in the Age of
Securitization, THE HANDBOOK OF ASSer-BACKED SECURITIES, supra note 19, at 156 (noting that
BBB-rated firm funding portfolios may save up to 60 basis points by collateralizing security with
consumer receivables instead of funding with corporate debt).
28. For a comprehensive analysis of securitization and loan participations see T. FRANKEL,
supra note 19, at Pt. III (Loan Participations).
29. PAVE., supra note 19, at 13-14.
30. RosENTHAL & OcAMPO, supra note 21, at 6-12; Shenker & Colletta supra note 12, at
1393-95. But see Forsyth, infra note 333 (discussing apparent misallocation of risks in CMO market).
31. PAVEL, supra note 19, at 16-17; Goldberg, Burke, Gordon, Pinkes & Watson, Asset
Securitization and Corporation Financial Health, THE HANDBOOK OF ASSE-BACKED SECURITIES,
supra note 19, at 179 [hereinafter Goldberg]; Kopff & Lent, supra note 27, at 156-57.
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greater control of asset-liability ratios. 2 Securitization is thus
significant since it reduces financial intermediaries' traditional
role."3 Structured financing has expanded sources of credit by
making it practical and cost effective for originators to place debt
directly with investors. In addition, credit enhancement devices,
such as letters of credit, surety bonds, and over collateralization,
which may be required to obtain an investment grade rating for an
offering, often result in ABSs having a higher rating than that of
the originator.34 In such instances, the originator's cost of capital
(net of securitization expenses) is lower than it would have been
had it issued the debt directly.35
Securitization has been a source of origination and servicing fee
income for asset originators. Structured financing has generated
additional underwriting compensation and trading commissions for
the major investment banking houses,36 although income from the
non-real estate-related ABS markets has been more volatile than
that from MBSs.37 Apart from federal agency and GSE guarantees
behind the vast majority of securitized residential real estate debt,
banks and insurance companies with the requisite underwriting
32. PAVEL, supra note 19, at 16-17; Goldberg, supra note 31, at 179; Kopff & Lent, supra
note 27, at 156-58. See ROSENTHAL & OCAMPO, supra note 21, at 219 (examining how securitization
may be used as a device to liquify assets, reduce leverage, and improve credit, thereby deterring
hostile takeovers).
33. Goldberg, supra note 31, at 178. See Starobin, Bypassing Banks, NAT'L J., Mar. 9,1991,
at 554 (discussing marketplace shift from commercial banks to non-bank providers of financial
services).
34. Asset Finance Group, The First Boston Corp., supra note 19, at 27-30; Bryan, supra note
26, at 17-18.
35. Asset Finance Group, The First Boston Corp., supra note 19, at 27-30; Barmat, supra note
19, at 5; Bryan, supra note 26, at 17-18, 27-30; Kopff & Lent, supra note 27, at 156. See Asset
Finance Group, The First Boston Corp., supra note 19, at 25-26 (outlining considerations bearing on
the decision to securitize). High quality loans are relatively less expensive to securitize. There is a
concern that this reduced securitization expense may result in a flight of such assets from depository
institutions and undermine the capital adequacy guidelines. Boemio & Edwards, supra note 19, at
661-62; Capital Adequacy Guidelines for Bank Holding Companies and State Member Banks:
Leverage Measure, 12 C.F.R. app. § 225 (1991). But see Shenker & Colletta, supra note 12, at 1395
n.124 (despite foregoing, on balance incentives to securitize should encourage institutions to adapt
higher underwriting standards).
36. Bryan, supra note 26, at 18. For rankings of investment banks in public underwritings and
private offerings of asset-backed securities, see Tables I and 2, infra, at pages 155 and 156.
37. Dannen, The FailedPromise of Asset-Backed Securities, 23 INSTrrtmONAL INVESTOR, Oct.
1989, at 261-64.
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skills have profited from guaranteeing the credit risks associated
with non-real estate-related ABSs3 8 With regard to borrowers, as
competition among lenders stimulated by securitization increases,
reduction in the cost of funds may be expected, resulting in more
flexible lending terms.39 Investors have profited from the
securities' high credit ratings, yields, and liquidity.' Asset-backed
securities have also become an important tool for investor portfolio
management 4 because their cash flows can be structured to meet
specific investor requirements.42
B. Structure and Principal Types of Asset-Backed Securities
Although the basic concept of the ABS is relatively
straightforward, such instruments have evolved from their origins,
in the secondary mortgage market into a variety of complex
38. Credit underwriting assumes knowledge and skills which may be lacking because the
process is relatively novel and complex. In 1985 Ticor Mortgage Insurance Company filed for
bankruptcy as a result of the default by Equity Programs Investment Corporation (EPIC) on it"
MBSs. ROSENTHAL & OcAmpo, supra note 21, at 17-18. Ticor was overexposed as principal
guarantor and had conducted an inadequate initial credit review. Id. See Note, The Private Mortgage
Insurer's Action for Rescission for Misrepresentation: Limiting a Potential Threat to Private Sector
Participation in the Secondary Mortgage Market, 47 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 589, 599-601 (1990)
(describing the EPIC default and arguing generally for limitation on insurers' right to rescind for
misrepresentation in insurance application in cases where applicant has sold loan on secondary
market) [hereinafter Note, The Private Mortgage Investor's Action]. See also Batte, War Stories From
The Due Diligence Zone, 51 MORTGAGE BANKING, Mar. 1991, at 47, 49 (describing mortgage
servicing deficiencies, including computer system under-use and "many serious investor compliance
violations" among "good cross-section" of mortgage banking industry); MOODY'S ANNUAL REPORT,
supra note 13, at 5-6 (noting increasing complexity of ABSs and trend toward higher risks and
adverse pressure on credit standards due to heightening competition among underwriters, trustees,
attorneys, accountants, and collateral credit enhancers); T. FRANKEL, supra note 19, § 3.4 at 94
(existing regulation of participants in securitization process "'inadequate"); STANDARD & POOR'S
CORP., Asset-Backed Securitization, STANDARD & POOR'S CREDIT REV., Mar. 1989, at 3-10
(discussing ABS rating process and related instrument and market risks).
39. PAVEL, supra note 19, at 15; ROsENTHAL & OcAmPO, supra note 21, at 12; Bryan, supra
note 26, at 18-19. Reductions in cost of funds have been estimated to be on the order of 100 basis
points or more. Id
40. L. BRYAN, supra note 27, at 81. Some ABS issues have been structured to offer yields
of 20 basis points more than highly liquid comparable investments. Id
41. See generally W. SHARPE, PORTFOLIO THEORY AND CAPITAL MARKETS (1970); R.
BREALEY & S. MYERS, PRINCIPALS OF CORPORATE FINANCE (1988) (both sources analyzing how
portfolio theory has led to reduction in firm-specific risk through diversification).
42. L. BRYAN, supra note 27, at 70, 73-74, 81-82; Goldberg, supra note 31, at 179.
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investment vehicles. The securities are the subject of extensive
analysis in a sizable body of literature and research reports.43 The
primary forms of the asset-backed security are described below.
Asset-backed securities can be structured as pass-through
instruments, pay-through bonds, or asset-backed bonds. Assuming
the present value of an asset's future cash flow can be ascertained,
the choice of structure depends on asset cash flow characteristics,
such as prepayment, delinquency, and default rates. The entity
owning the assets must also consider whether to transfer or retain
ownership. In this regard, the decreased balance sheet burden
resulting from a sale must be weighed against the consequences of
recognizing gains or losses on the sale.' Detailed construction
43. See, e.g., sources cited supra notes 19 and 21. See also L. BRYAN, BANKRuP. RESTORING
THE HEALTH AND PROFITABILITY OF OUR BANKING SYSTEM Pt. III, § 8 (1991) (discussing, inter
alia, implications of securitization for future structure of banking industry); EDSON & JACOBS,
SECONDARY MORTGAGE MARKEr GUIDE (1991) (describing legal aspects of secondary mortgage
market); J. HENDERSON & J. SCOTT, SEcURrTIzATION (1988) (describing process and development
of securitization in the U.S. and United Kingdom); J. WALMSLEY, THE NEw FINANCIAL
INsTRUMENTS 227-70 (1988) (describing securitization process and growth of real estate-related
ABSs); THE HANDBOOK OF FIXED INCOME SECURIrIES Pt. 4 (F. Fabozzi 3d ed. 1991) (discussing
mortgage-backed and asset-backed securities); 5 THE LIBRARY OF INVESTMENT BANKING, MORTGAGE
AND ASSET SEcURmZA7ON (R. Kuhn ed. 1990) (comprehensive treatment of real estate-related
securitization and asset-based finance); CALIFORNIA DEPr. OF REAL ESTATE, A REVIEW OF
SECONDARY MORTGAGE MARKET Acrvmas, INsT. CALIF. REAL EST. RES. (June 1990) (describing
development of secondary mortgage market and surveying recent developments); Parks, The ABCs
of CMOs, REMICs and IO/POs: Rocket Science Comes to Mortgage Finance, J. ACCT., Apr. 1991,
at 41; Shaw, Developments in Securitzed Markets: Selected Legal Considerations Relating to
Asset-Backed Securities, in PRAc. L. INST., TwENTY-SECOND ANN. INST. ON SEC. REG. (1990), at
247 (surveying recent developments). See also Changes in Our Financial System: Globalization of
Capital Markets and Securitization of Credit: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Banking,
Housing and Urban Affairs, 100th Cong., Ist Sess. 203 (1987) (including, inter alia, various views
of ramifications of securitization on the current and future structure of U.S. financial system)
reprinted in U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS (1987).
44. Barmat, supra note 19, at 6-7. Whether or not the entity sells the assets to a limited
purpose vehicle, it must be insulated from the bankruptcy of the seller. Sellers usually retain some
interest in the assets and frequently have servicing rights. See Schwarcz, Structured Finance: The
New Way to Securitize Assets, 11 CARDozo L REV. 607, 608-27 (1990) (discussing asset title
transfer by originator-seller and related seller bankruptcy issues).
It is important to note at the outset that a thorough analysis of whether a particular asset-backed
arrangement involves a "'security" under banking law and under securities law must be conducted.
Additional determinations must be made as to the identity of the issues and underwriter of, and dealer
in, the securities, and whether the securities are equity or debt. T. FRANKL, supra note 19, at §§ 7.7-
7.14, § 8, §§ 11-13. It would not be on overstatement to describe the current state of the law in this
area as unsettled, convoluted and frequently contradictory.
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and precise terms of the securities are determined on the bases of
computer matrices and pricing and yield factors. 45
Pass-through ABSs represent direct, undivided fractional
interests in a pool of assets such as mortgage or credit card
receivables.46 The asset portfolio is held in a grantor trust (usually
formed by the asset owner) which issues certificates evidencing
ownership to investors.47 The owner sells the assets, removing
them from the balance sheet, to the trust, which is deemed to be
created by the investors. In return, the owner receives the proceeds
from certificate sales and, frequently, fees for servicing the assets
as well. In order to preserve the non-taxable status of the trust,
principal and interest payments received by the trust, less trust
expenses, must be passed through directly to investors on a pro rata
basis.48 The trust acts as a static conduit for the cash flows
received and subsequent distributions to investors cannot be
modified, for example, by issuing additional classes of certificates
having different maturities, interest rates, or payment schedules.49
Since title to the assets is held by the trust, investors bear
prepayment and default risks."
Pay-through instruments, in comparison with pass-through
securities, are more flexible and market-sensitive. Pay-through
bonds constitute debt of the issuer which is secured by a pool of
assets, and are pledged as collateral for the payment of principal
and interest on the bonds.5 Payments of bond principal and
45. LORB, supra note 19, § 3 at 6-21; T. FRANKEL, supra note 19, § 2.7 at 57 n.2.
46. PAVEL, supra note 19, at 4-6; Kunz, Securities Laws Considerations, THE AssuT
SEcuRmT ZA ON HANDBOOK, supra note 19, at 348-49; Murray & Hadaway, Mortgage-Backed
Securities: An Investigation of Legal and Financial Issues, I 1 J. CORP. L 203, 207-08 (1986).
47. PAVEL, supra note 19, at 4-6; Barmat, supra note 19, at 7-8; Kunz, supra note 46, at 48-
49.
48. Barmat, supra note 19, at 7-8; Kunz, supra note 46, at 348-49; Pittman, Economic and
Regulatory Developments Affecting Mortgage Related Securities, 64 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 497, 503,
508-09.
49. Kunz, supra note 46, at 348-49; Pittman, supra note 48, at 503, 508-09.
50. PAVEL_, supra note 19, at 4-6; Barmat, supra note 19, at 7-8; Kunz, supra note 46, at
348-49; Murray & Hadaway, supra note 46, at 207; Pittman, supra note 48, at 503-05.
51. PAVEr., supra note 19, at 8-9; Barmat, supra note 19, at 8-9; Kunz, supra note 46, at 350-
51; Watson & Joint, Rating Asset-Backed Transactions, THE AssEt SEcunrnZAON HANDBOOK,
supra note 19, at 228-29.
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interest need not be tied to payments on the collateral.52
Pay-through bonds are issued by a limited purpose entity
established as a subsidiary of the parent asset owner.53 Proceeds
from the sale of the bonds are used to finance the contemporaneous
acquisition of the assets from the parent.54 The bonds are issued
under a trust indenture pursuant to which cash flow from the
collateral can be reconfigured into a single or series of bond
tranches (classes) with maturities, interest rates, and payment terms
different from those of the underlying assets.55
Pay-through bonds originated in the MBS market in 1983 and
are frequently structured as collateralized mortgage obligations
(CMOs). 56 Collateralized mortgage obligations are collateralized
by pass-through MBSs and are generally issued in at least four
classes, as follows: short-term, medium-term, long-term, and zero
coupon (Z) tranches.57 Except for the Z tranche, each tranche
receives periodic interest payments.58 All principal payments,
including prepayments, are applied to retire the tranches
sequentially, commencing with the earliest maturing tranche.
59
Pay-through bonds are treated as debt of the issuer, which may
therefore deduct interest paid to bondholders and partially offset
income received from the collateral.'
52. LORE, supra note 19, § 3 at 14-15; ROSENTHAL & OCAMPO, supra note 21, at 54-58;
Murray & Hadaway, supra note 46, at 208-10.
53. As an alternative to the limited purpose financial subsidiary of the asset owner, a special
purpose ABS corporation may be formed as a subsidiary of an entity not affiliated with the asset
owner. Kunz, supra note 46, at 349-51. Such unaffiliated entities are typically broker-dealers which
underwrite ABS offerings. Id The corporation finances the purchase of assets by issuing securities
under a trust indenture. Id The corporation offers asset owners the advantage of disposing of assets
through SEC Rule 415 offering procedure as an alternative to multiple registrations. Id.
54. ROsENTrHAL & OcAmpo, supra note 21, at 54-58; Kunz, supra note 46, at 349-50.
55. Id.
56. LoiRE, supra note 19, § 3 at 19-24; PAVEL, supra note 19, at 8-9; RosENTHAL & OCAMPO,
supra note 21, at 54-58; Barmat, supra note 19, at 8-9; Pittman, supra note 48, at 506-08.
57. LoRE, supra note 19, § 3 at 19-24; ROsENTHAL & OcAMpo, supra note 21, at 54-58;
Pittman, supra note 48, at 506-08. Tranche Maturities typically range from 5 through 20 years.
58. LORE, supra note 19, § 3 at 20-22; Pittman, supra note 48, at 506-07.
59. LoRE, supra note 19, § 3 at 19-23; Pittman, supra note 48, at 507. Tranche maturities
typically range from five through 20 years.
60. LoRe, supra note 19, § 3 at 19-24; ROsENTHAL & OcAMpo, supra note 21, at 54-58;
Barmat, supra note 19, at 8; Pittman, supra note 48, at 507. The Tax Reform Act of 1986 included
legislation that provided issuers the option of structuring issues for accounting purposes as a sale or
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Asset-backed bonds represent direct obligations of the issuer.
The bonds are collateralized by a discrete asset pool pledged to
secure payment of a specified percentage return, and have a fixed
maturity date."1 The assets are retained on the issuer's balance
sheet and the bonds become new liabilities.62 Principal and
interest payments on the bonds may be structured in a single class
(asset-backed note) or multiple classes.63 Bond payments need not
derive from or match cash flows from the pledged collateral."
Bond value is based on the market value of the collateral or its
discounted future cash flow value.65 Asset-backed bonds are
generally overcollateralized; the collateral is evaluated periodically
as debt financing. Act of Oct. 22, 1986, Pub. L No. 99-514, 1986, U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEws (100 Stat.) 2085 (1986). See Act of Nov. 10, 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-647, 1988, U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEws (102 Stat.) 3342 (1988). The real estate mortgage investment conduit
(REMIC) legislated by the Act permits issuers to avoid dual taxation, as with CMOs, without having
to structure the transaction as a debt offering. See generally K. LORE & K. KUSMA,
MORTGAGE-BACKED SECURIES - SPEcIAL UPDATE: REMICS (REAL ESTATE MORTGAGE
INVESmMENT CONDurrs) (1987) (tracing background of REMICs, REMIC rules and associated
securities and tax law aspects). Multiclass ABSs may be structured as derivative instruments such as
stripped securities. Interest only strips (1Os) and principal only strips (POs) represent the right to
receive all the interest and principal, respectively, from the underlying asset pool's cash flow.
Pittman, supra note 48, at 509-12. Asset-backed securities residuals represent claims on cash flows
from collateral, net of all payments to investors and expenses. lad Residuals result from the spread
between the asset pool's weighted average interest rate and the bends' interest rate, over
collateralization, and income from investing cash flow until it is distributed to investors. ld. Floating
rate ABSs tie investor returns to fluctuations in widely accepted interest rate indices, such as the
London Inter-Bank Offering Rate (LIBOR). Id Planned amortization class (PAC) and targeted
amortization class (TAC) bonds attempt to achieve more definite duration by using prepayments on
the underlying collateral to maintain the principal repayment schedule of the PAC tranche of the
bonds. Id This may, however, increase the volatility of the other classes. LORE, supra note 19, § 3,
at 24-26; Pittman, supra note 48, at 509-12.
61. LORE, supra note 19, § 3 at 28-30; Barmat, supra note 19, at 7. Asset-backed bonds may
be, but are infrequently, issued by special purpose entities. T. FRANKEL, supra note 19, § 8.4 at 294.
62. The bonds are issued directly by the company - ipso facto they are the company's
liability.
63. LORE, supra note 19, § 3 at 28; PAVEL, supra note 19, at 7-8; Barmat, supra note 19, at
7.
64. LORE, supra note 19, § 3 at 30; Asset Finance Group, The First Boston Corp., supra note
19, at 41-42.
65. Barmat, supra note 19, at 7. Cf LORE, supra note 19, § 3 at 28 (comparing collateral
structure of mortgage-backed bonds, which are based on collateral's market value, with pay-through
bonds, which are collateralized on basis of collateral pool cash flow).
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and is added to, when necessary, in the event of unanticipated
prepayments, defaults or declines in market value.'
The ability to restructure asset cash flows allows multi-class
debt instruments to be constructed to meet investor requirements
regarding maturity and reduces the cost to issuers by obtaining the
lowest blended yield to investors. 7 Multi-class ABSs with varying
tranche maturities and coupon rates can be designed to produce a
lower weighted average interest rate than the interest rate for a
single maturity security."
66. LORE, supra note 19, § 3 at 28-30 (relating to mortgage-backed bonds); PAvEL supra note
19, at 7; Barnat, supra note 19, at 7; Pittman, supra note 48, at 500-01, 507 n.47. Asset-backed
preferred stock and asset-backed commercial paper are issued through limited purpose vehicles.
PAVEL, supra note 19, at 9-10; ROSENTHAL & OCAMO, supra note 21, at 199-201; Asset Finance
Group, The First Boston Corp., supra note 19, at 42-43; Hourican, Receivable-Backed Commercial
Paper, TMHE HANDBOOK OF Assur-BACKED SECURnTIEs, supra note 19, at 315-19.
With respect to preferred stock, the vehicles are subsidiaries of the parent asset owner which
purchases consumer and trade receivables from the parent to collateralize stock dividends and
redemption rights. Asset Finance Group, The First Boston Corp., supra note 19, at 42. Asset-backed
preferred stock dividends are given favorable tax treatment in the hands of corporate investors which
can utilize the 80% "dividends received" deduction. I.R.C. § 243(a) (1982). The deduction allows
asset-backed preferred stock to be issued at a lower dividend rate than the interest rate on equivalent
corporate debt. Haspel & Bush, The Treatment of "Securitized"' Investment Opportunities, 5 L TAX'N
I~vEsmEN1s 60, 62 (1987). Overcollateralization and irrevocable letters of credit or surety bonds
support the stock and can also result in ratings sufficiently high to permit issuers to borrow at interest
rates below that of commercial paper. Asset Finance Group, The First Boston Corp., supra note 19,
at 42. Asset-backed commercial paper is commonly used to finance sales of receivables. PAVEL,
supra note 19, at 9; ROSENTHAL & OcAMpo, supra note 21, at 199-201; Hourican, supra, at 315.
Asset-backed commercial paper may take the form of direct-pay on standby commercial paper. Such
paper is variously supported by bank letters of credit, corporate guarantees, surety bonds and
insurance policies. Asset-backed paper may also be issued as market value commercial paper, which
is supported by an overcollateralized asset pool. PAVEL, supra note 19, at 9-10; ROSENTHAL &
OCAMPO, supra note 21, at 200; Asset Finance Group, The First Boston Corp., supra note 19, at 42-
43; Hourican, supra, at 315-19; MOODY'S ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 13, at 16.
67. ROSENTHAl. & OcM o, supra note 21, at 55.
68. d at 56.
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II. OVERVIEW OF ASSET-BACKED MARKETS 69
Total volume of international structured offerings rose from
$93.8 billion in 1986 to $158 billion in 1989.70 In 1990, an 11.1%
increase in volume to $175.5 billion is forecast." Since the
beginning of structured financing in the early 1970's, U.S. issuers
have overwhelmingly dominated the structured financing market.7 2
However, securitization, primarily real estate-related, is increasing
in the U.K., Europe -- notably France -- and Australia, and non-
69. Market data concerning GNMA, FNMA and FHLMC securities is the most comprehensive
and reliable. Data concerning private sector public offerings of real estate and non-real estate-related
ABSs is available from fewer sources. Such data is often not truly comparable because of tho absence
of uniformly agreed upon definitions of various types of ABSs, among other reasons. Reliable
information about ABS private placements is the most difficult to obtain. Ostensibly comparable data
from different sources often show considerable disparities, in some cases making comparisons
meaningless. See LoRr, supra note 19, § I at 23-24 (stating that data concerning public and private
M1BS offerings by private sectors are "less definitive" than for GSEs, and that data provided by a
"variety of sources ... seldom correlate;" asserting that actual size of private sector is "somewhat
illusory"). It should be added that the foregoing is doubly the case with respect to non-U.S. issuers
in non-U.S. markets. This situation should improve given the level of market interest in ABSs. Duff
& Phelps Credit Rating Company recently scheduled a conference in Tokyo in response to Japanese
demands for more detailed market data. See Duff & Phelps Holds Tokyo Investor Conference, PR
NEwswmE (Oct. 8, 1990) (LEXIS, Nexis library, Currot file). The difficulties of obtaining accurate
and comprehensive data on ABS markets mirror a similar state of affairs with respect to the
information currently available concerning institutional investors and markets. See Brancato &
Gaughan, The Growth of lnstitutional Investors in U.S. Capital Markets, INST. INVESTOR PROJECT,
COLUM. CENmR FOR L. & EcoN. STUD. (Nov. 1988). Data on institutional investors and markets
"must be painstakingly constructed from a wide variety of sources, few of which provide consistent
comparison." Id at iii, cited in Note, The Capital Markets in Transition: A Response to New SEC
Rule 144A, 66 IND. L. 3.233,238 n.22 (1990) [hereinafter Note, The CapitalMarkets in Transition].
The implications of the lack of reliable market data generally were brought home with respect to Rule
144A by Congressman John Dingell (D-Mich.), Chairman, House Committee on Energy and
Commerce. In response to the SEC's first semi-annual report on the use of Rule 144A, see infra note
105, Cong. Dingell charged that the Commission used anecdotal evidence rather than substantive
data, and has requested that the General Accounting Office scrutinize the Commission's methodology
and data quality. Dingell: Cram It, Quinn: Expand It, INST. INVESTOR, CORP. FN. WEEK (Mar. 11,
1991) (LEXIS, Nexis library, Curmt file). Investment Dealer's Digest, Inc., has announced a new
weekly publication, Private Placement Letter, which is set to report detailed data on private
(including 144A) markets. IDD Launches New Private Placement Letter - The Weekly Chronicle of
The Private and 144A Markets, PR NEvswnmE, Jan. 16, 1991 (LEXIS, Nexis library, Curmt file).
70. MOODY'S ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 13, at 5.
71. Id. at 3, 5-6.
72. ld. at 6.
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U.S. markets are said to be on the verge of "explosive growth."'
In the United States, as of February 1990, the twentieth anniversary
of the first offering of a GNMA guaranteed mortgage security, in
excess of $900 billion in mortgage-related securities were estimated
to be outstanding.74  The market for real estate-related
pass-through securities is comprised almost entirely of direct
offerings of the FNMA and FHLMC, offerings collateralized by
GNMA pass-throughs and other GSE securities.75 Nevertheless,
from 1984, when the Secondary Mortgage Market Enhancement
Act (SMMEA) 76 was enacted to encourage increased private
sector (non-GSE) involvement in the secondary mortgage market,
private offerings rose from $10 billion" to $71 billion in 1988.78
73. Id. at 3-6, 19-21. In 1989, U.K. mortgage-backed offerings totaled $2.9 billion, and in
Australia structured financing issues amounted to $1.6 billion. Id. at 3, 19-21. The first asset-backed
offering in France occurred in 1989. Id The growth of securitization is due in large measure to the
privatization movement and deregulation occurring in Europe. L at 20. Securitization of third world
debt has been discussed as a means of alleviating pressures on LDEs (less developed countries) and
banks' LDC loan portfolios. Puchala, Securitizing Third World Debt, 1989 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 137,
170-71. But see Leebron, First Things First: A Comment on Securiizing Third World Debt, 1989
COLUM. Bus. L R v. 173, 173-75, 173 (stating that securitization benefits lenders only and does not
address developing countries' basic socioeconomic problems, in contrast to debt-equity swaps and
the other approaches aimed at de-leveraging third world economies). Cf. Simpson, The Greening of
Global Investment; How the Environment Ethics and Politics Are Reshaping Strategies, THE
ECONOMIST (Spec. Report No. 2108) (Jan. 1991) (discussing variety and relative influence of ethical
considerations on investment decisions).
74. STANDARD & POOR'S CoRP., Standard & Poor's Credit Forum - Structured Finance
Turns 20, PR NawswntE (Feb. 23, 1990) (LEXIS, Nexis library, Curmt file). The $900 billion figure
does not include securities collateralized by other mortgage-backed securities. Id The mortgage-
related securities market, including mortgage-backed pass-through securities, CMOs, REMICs, and
stripped mortgage-backed pass-through securities, had an average growth rate of 25% per annum
during the period 1980-89. Id
75. LORE, supra note 19, § I at 12,23; Pittman, supra note 48, at 539. The size of the private
sector's share of the MBS market has been estimated to be in the range of 5%. Id.
76. Act of Oct. 3, 1984, Pub. L No. 98-440, 1984, U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws (98
Stat.) 1689 (1984). See generally LORE, supra note 19, § 1 at 59-62 (tracing background and impact
of SMMEA on secondary mortgage market). See also Pittman, supra note 48, at 512-38 (analyzing
in detail major SMMEA provisions).
77. Database, Secondary Mortgage Markets (Summer 1986). Secondary Mortgage Markets
is a publication of the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation. Database is a periodic supplement
to that publication which contains data on the mortgage banking industry.
78. Database, Secondary Mortgage Markets (Spring 1989). Figures represent public issues;
actual total is higher when private placements are included.
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The first public offering of non-real estate-related ABSs,
computer leases, occurred in 1985."9 The two dominant non-real
estate-related securitized assets, automobile loans and credit card
receivables, were first marketed in 1984 and 1986, respectively.8D
As of year-end 1987, thirty-five percent of home mortgages, five
percent of automobile loans, one percent of commercial mortgages,
and two percent of credit card receivables had been securitized."
Thie $770 billion in securitized loans outstanding as of 1987
compared with a total of more than $4 trillion in potentially
securitizable assets.8 2
For 1990, volume of U.S. domestic MBS public issues was
$139.6 billion, a twenty-one percent increase over 1989 volume.83
Asset-backed underwritings (non-real estate-related issues) totaled
$40.4 billion in 1990, a seventy-two percent rise from the prior
79. Barmat, supra note 19, at 14.
80. L. BRYAN, supra note 27, at 77. With respect to the dominance of automobile loans and
credit card receivables in the non-real estate related markets, see graph, Consumer Loan-Backed
Securities Trends, infra, at page 162 (illustrating auto loans and credit card receivables under
combined title, 'Consumer Loan-Backed Securities").
81. L BRYAN, supra note 27, at 77-78 (citing as sources, Federal Reserve Board and
McKinsey & Company estimates).
82. Id. Securitizable asset classes comprising the $3.4 trillion total in 1986 are, as follows:
Consumer $1,546 46%
Mortgages $1.2 63%
Installment 0.4 21
Other 0.5 16
Corporate 1,836 54
Mortgages 0.5 24
Trade receivables 0.7 38
Bank loans 0.6 29
Other 0.3 14
S3,382 ____
Id. (citing as source, McKinsey & Company analysis), id., at 79. (Numbers in chart represent
billions).
83. The 1991 Corporate Sweepstakes, INsTrunoNAL INvEsToR, Feb. 1991, at 17. There were
4,439 domestic MBS public issues in 1990. Id.
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year's volume.84 As of mid-1990, the total volume of combined
mortgage and non-real estate-related asset-backed debt exceeded
sixty percent of the U.S. domestic debt market.8 5
Data on the U.S. private placement market shows volume rising
from $15.9 billion in 1980 to $165.6 billion in 1989.86 In 1990,
however, volume fell back to $116.4 billion.87 Private offerings
represented 21.7% of the $73.3 billion in total 1980 U.S.
financings."8 By 1989, private offerings amounted to 34.9% of the
$475 billion in total 1989 fimancings.89 The 1990 decline in
volume saw private offerings drop to 27.6% of the $437.8 billion
in total 1990 corporate financings."
Private placements of securitized debt grew in volume from
$4.9 billion in 1984 to $12.1 billion in 1985, and reached $28.8
billion in 1987.9' In 1989, volume dropped to $14.7 billion, and
in 1990, to $12.6 billion.' The 1989-90 fall-off, while attributable
principally to adverse economic conditions, may also have been
due in part to the increasing standardization of asset-backed
products and investors' growing understanding of associated
84. Id. at 89 (reporting IDD Information Services, Inc. data); Pratt, Treasury Rally Sparks
Strong Finish for Debt; ABS and Optimism for 1991: Merrill Lynch Strengthens Grip on
Underwriting Crown, INVESTMENT DEALER'S Dio., Jan. 7, 1991, at 17.
85. First Half 1990 Reflects 8.7 Percent Growth in Underwriting Volumes; Mortgage-acked
Financings Slow, Asset-Backed Debt Booms, PR NEWSWIRE (June 29, 1990) (LEXIS, Nexis library,
Currnt file).
86. Pressman, Sea Change Sweeps Private Mart in 1980s; But It Didn't Ebb and Flow with
Public Market, INVESmENT DEALER'S DIO., Apr. 30, 1990, at 25. There were 967 private offerings
in 1980 and 2,325 offerings in 1990. IL Data excludes CDs and deposit notes, and is based on
reports from investment banks and commercial banks acting as agents in placements; total volume
is underestimated because securities placed directly with investors are not counted. Id. at 28.
87. Goldman Wears Two-Tiered Crown as 1990"s Top Private Placement Agent,
INsTrruroNAL INvasToR, CoRp. FIN. WEEK supp. (Mar. 11, 1991) (LEXIS, Nexis library, Curmt
file) (citing as source, Securities Data Co.). Data excludes CDs and deposit notes. Id
88. Pressman, supra note 86, at 25.
89. Id.
90. Gillen, Private Placements Plunged 27% in 1990, Hurt By Flight to Quality, ESOPs'
Decline, BOND BUYER, Mar. 8, 1991, at 3.
91. Pressman, supra note 86, at 26.
92. Goldman Wears Two-Tiered Crown as 1990"s Top Private Placement Agent, supra note
87.
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risks." In contrast, the volume of public offerings of mortgage
and non-real estate related ABSs has grown steadily. Issue volume
in 1984 was $12.3 billion and $22.3 billion in 1985.94 By 1990,
the total volume of publicly-issued real estate- and non-real estate
related ABSs had reached $180 billion.95
With respect to growth prospects, the United States ABS
market is forecast to advance at a more moderate pace, consistent
with having reached a mature stage, although the consumer loan
(principally automobile and credit card receivables), commercial
mortgage, and corporate debt-backed sectors should experience
continued rapid increases in volume. 9 In Europe and Japan, as
securitization as a corporate financing technique and related
technology begin to take hold, substantial future volume growth
may be expected.'
93. Pressman, supra note 86, at 26. See Atwater, Criteria for Predicting Asset-Backed Issuers
of the Next Decade, AM. BANKER, June 8,1990, Supp. 16A-17A (noting growth of structured finance
in 1990's was characterized, in part, by standardization ofsecuritized instruments among high volume
issuers); Dannen, supra note 37, at 262-64 (stating that non-real estate-related ABS offerings are
evolving into lower fee generating "commodities business" for investment bankers, reducing profit
margins to level of Rule 415 shelf-registration issues). Cf. Tufano, Financial Innovation and
First-MoverAdvantages, 25 J. FIN. ECON. 213 (1989). Based on an examination of investment banks'
profits from development of new financial products, including mortgage and non-real estate-related
ABSs during the period 1974-1986, the author makes the following conclusions: New product
originators do not charge higher prices during the period preceding the appearance of imitative
products; originators' long run pricing is below that of rivals' imitative products; and originators'
greater revenues are derived from larger number of underwritings, L e., greater market share, obtained
with innovations as contrasted with sales of clones. Id. at 234.
94. The 1991 Corporate Sweepstakes, supra note 83, at 91-92.
95. Id
96. MOODY'S ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 13, at 6,20-21.
97. Harvey, Securitization Goes International, BANKER'S MAO., May/June 1991, at 25;
MOODY'S ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 13, at 6,20-21; Steves, Going Global: MBS Markets Abroad
Are Seeing a Quickening Pace of Growth. The United Kingdom and France Are Among The Front-
Runners Making a Strong Move to Securitization, 51 MORToAo E BANKING 7, 24 (Apr. 1991);
Opportunities and Risks in Securitizing Markets, EUROMONEY, May 1991, Supp. 7. See SHALE,
Security in Big Numbers, EUROMONEY, Mar. 1991, at 37 (describing projected $50-100 billion ABS
market in Japan within five years and growing banking and corporate pressures on existing legal
obstacles to market's development). See generally STANDARD & POOR'S CORP., International
Structured Finance, STANDARD & POOR'S CREDIT Rnv., Apr. 15, 1991 (reporting on current
developments in global expansion of securitization outside U.S.).
To add perspective to the discussion in Part V concerning Rule 144A, Regulation S, and ABS
markets, portions of MOODY'S ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 13, at 3, 5, 7, 10-21 are reproduced in
the text, infra, at pages 159-173.
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TABLE 1
Ranking Underwriters of Public Offerings of Mortgage-Backed
and Asset-Backed Securities: January 1 to December 31, 1990
Mortgage-Backed Securities"
1990 S Volume # of(Millions) Issues
10 1 Kidder Peabody $18,783.4 639
2 2 Bear Steams 17,375.1 516
1 3 Goldman Sachs 14,691.5 320
5 4 First Boston 12,455.0 418
3 5 Prudential Bache 12,221.5 313
4 6 Salomon Brothers 11,963.3 266
6 7 Merrill Lynch 11,047.7 392
7 8 Lehman Brothers 10,571.1 365
8 9 Morgan Stanley 5,331.8 150
11 10 Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette 5,202.1 278
13 11 PaineWebber 3,274.8 135
12 J.P. Morgan Securities 3,045.7 92
12 13 UBS Securities 2,978.5 137
19 14 Normura Securities 2,892.3 118
14 15 Citicorp Securities 2,646.3 65
Total Market Volume $139,606.5 4,439
155
98. The 1991 Corporate Sweepstakes, supra note 83, at 89 (reporting IDD Information
Services, Inc. data). These rankings include all fmnly underwritten taxable debt issues offered during
the period January I to December 31, 1990. Figures are reported at the net, not the principal, amount,
and private placements are excluded.
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TABLE 2
Ranking Underwriters of Public Offerings of Mortgage-Backed and
Asset-Backed Securities: January 1 to December 31, 1990
Asset-Backed Securities?9
1989 1990 $ Volume # of
(Millions) Issues
3 1 Merrill Lynch 10,298.1 30
1 2 First Boston 8,384.1 24
2 3 Goldman Sachs 5,655.7 12
6 4 Salomon Brothers 4,847.3 13
4 5 Dean Witter 3,984.2 9
11 6 Morgan Stanley 2,069.3 9
5 7 Chemical Securities 1,533.1 6
8 Citicorp Securities 701.8 2
9 J.P. Morgan Securities 649.2 2
8 10 Lehman Brothers 499.2 2
11 Chase Securities 498.7 1
7 12 Prudential Bache 480.6 4
12 13 Bear Stearns 388.2 1
14 Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette 299.2 2
15 BT Securities 74.5 1
Total Market Volume $40,363.5 118
99. The 1991 Corporate Sweepstakes, supra note 83, at 89 (reporting IDD Information
Services, Inc. data). These rankings include all firmly underwritten taxable debt issues offered during
the period January I to December 31, 1990. Figures are reported at the net, not the principal, amount,
and private placements are excluded.
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1991 / Asset-Backed Securities
1988 1989 1990
actual actual forecast
TRENDS
Volume($BiI) 140.9 158.0 175.5
%Change +46% +12.1% +11.1%
Credit Direction Slightly Slightly Slightly
Down Down Down
US CMOs 94.5
US Consumer Loan-Hacked 4
US RMPT
US Market Value
US Commercial Mitg-Backed 3
US Home Equity 2.9
Government Asset Sales 2.5
Euro (Repackaged) Bonds 1.9
UK Mtg-Backed 2.9
Australia Structured 1.5
France Asset-Backed 0.1(S)
1989 Structured Finance Market
SOURCE: Moody's Annual Report, supra note 13
(reprinted with Moody's permission).
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SOURCE: Moody's Annual Report, supra note 13
(reprinted with Moody's permission).
SBillions
1988 197 1988 1989 199O(foreeast)
1986-1990 Total Structured Finance Market
1991 / Asset-Backed Securities
CMO
TRENDS
Volume($BiI)
%Change
Issues
Issuers
Active Bankers
Sector Rating
Credit Direction
1988 1989 1990
actual actual forecast
I N'
76.1
+28%
292
38
19
Aaa
Stable
94.5 104.0
+24% +10%
273
23
21
Aaa
Stable
243
12
19
Aaa
Stable
By Collateral Type By Issuer Type
1989 Market Volume ($Bil)
SOURCE: Moody's Annual Report, supra note 13
(reprinted with Moody's permission).
Consumer Loan-
Backed Securities
TRENDS
Volume($BIl)
%Change
Issues
Issuers
Active Bankers
Sector Rating
Credit Direction
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1988 1989 1990
actual actual forecast
I I I
15.5
+58%
59
36
12
Aal
Slightly
Down
22.0
+41.9%
61
31
13
Aal
Slightly
Down
25.0
+ 14%
67
35
15
Aal
Slightly
Down
(SBil)
Cards
1985-1990 Consumer Loan Backed Volume
SOURCE: Moody's Annual Report, supra note 13
(reprinted with Moody's permission).
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1988 1989 19901988 1989 1990
actual actual forecast
I ''
Commercial
Mortgage-Backed
Securities
TRENDS
Volume($Bil)
%Change
Issues
Issuers
Active Bankers
Sector Rating
Credit Direction
4.0
+33%
45
40
9
Aa
Slightly
Down
1988 198E)aI v
rl Property-Specific vs. Pool Transactions
1988-1990 Percentage Share
SOURCE: Moody's Annual Report, supra note 13
(reprinted with Moody's permission).
2.5
+92%
31
25
5
Aa
Slightly
Down
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3.0
+20%
36
30
6
Aa
Down
Corporate 1988 1989 1990
Debt-Backed actual actual forecast
Securities
TRENDS /
Volume($Bil)
%Change
Issues
Issuers
Active Bankers
Sector Rating
0.9 2.9
- +222%
4
4
2
Baa
1311
7
Baa
3.9
+34%
18
15
9
Baa
One-Year
Default Rate for
Speculative-
Grade Debt
Junk Bond Market
12
10
I0
2
1970 1975 1980 1985 1980
225.2
191.0
AlT 146.4
22.6
1981 1987 2988 1989
SOURCE: Moody's Annual Report, supra note 13
(reprinted with Moody's permission).
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1988 1989 1990
Government actual actual forecast
Asset Sales
TRENDS
Volume($BiI) 13.8 2.5 2.0
%Change +221% -82% -20%
Issues 9 5 5
Issuers 7 4 4
Active Bankers 6 5 5
Sector Rating Aaa Aal Aa2
Credit Direction Stable Slightly Slightly
Down Down
(Smil)
United States 582.7
Tunisia 196287442
Israel 8744._
Jordan 423.1 1988
Turkey 3 3 96. 5
United States 1130.4
Morocco 208.0
Pakistan 765.1 
1989
1988-1989 Market Volume by Country
SOURCE: Moody's Annual Report, supra note 13
(reprinted with Moody's permission).
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Leveraged
Income Funds
TRENDS
Volume($Bil)
%Change
Issues
Issuers
Active Bankers
Sector Rating
Credit Direction
1988
actual
I
14
10
4
"aaa"
Stable
1989 1990
actual forecast
1]I
1.8 2.0
0% +10%
14
8
7
"aaa"
Stable
18
8
8
"aaa"
Stable
Municipal Bonds 42%
Preferred Stock 14%
Aust. Gov't Sees. 13%
Agency Securities 4%U.S. Govt Bonds 4%
Corporate Bonds 11%
Common Stock 11%
Primary Portfolio Investments
for Leveraged Income Funds
SOURCE: Moody's Annual Report, supra note 13
(reprinted with Moody's permission).
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Residential
Mortgage
Pass-Throughs
TRENDS
Volume($Bil)
%Change
Issues
Issuers
Active Bankers
Sector Rating
Credit Direction
1988
actual
_/
15.1
+65%
181
36
16
Aa2
Stable
1989 1990
actual forecast
I I
15.0
-1%
147
32
17
Aa2
Stable
16.5
+10%
160
30
17
Aa2
Stable
Pass-Through Volume and FRM/ARM Spread
1988-1989
Basis Points
'FA M J J'A S 0 N D J F M A M J J A S 0 N D
1986 1989
-0- FRU/ARM Rate Spread- = FRU Volume = ARM Volume
"Source: Office of Thrift Supervision
SOURCE: Moody's Annual Report, supra note 13
(reprinted with Moody's permission).
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Home Equity/
Second Mortgage-
Backed Securities
TRENDS
Volume($Bil)
%Change
Issues
Issuers
Sector Rating
Credit Direction
1989 1990
actual forecast
7
6
Aal
NA
9
7
Aal
Slightly
Down
SOURCE: Moody's Annual Report, supra note 13
(reprinted with Moody's permission).
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Third Party and
Market Value
Commercial Paper
TRENDS
Volume($Bil)
%Change
Issues
Active Bankers
Sector Rating
Credit Direction
1988 1989 1990
actual actual forecast
, 1 1
9.2
+35%
70
21
P-1
Stable
18.5
+100%
100
31
P-1
Stable
19.5
6%
110
31
P-1
Stable
Market-Value-Supported 14%
Direct-Pay LOC 62%.
Standby LOC 24%
U.S. Market for Third Party and Market Value
Commercial Paper
SOURCE: Moody's Annual Report, supra note 13
(reprinted with Moody's permission).
BANK-
GUARANTEED
EUROBOND
TRENDS
Volume($Bil)
%Change
Issues
Issuers
Active Bankers
Sector Rating
Credit Direction
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1988 1989
actual actual
I I
14.3
-4%
194
189
16
Aaa/Aa
Stable
16.5
+15%
127
118
17
Aaa/Aa
Stable
1990
forecast
-I
14.2
-14%
110
105
17
Aaa/Aa
Stable
REPACKAGED BONDS
Outstanding Ratings of Repackaged Eurobonds
SOURCE: Moody's Annual Report, supra note 13
(reprinted with Moody's permission).
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U.S. Mortgage-
Backed&
Collateralized
Bond
TRENDS
Vglume($Bil)
%Change
Issues
Issuers
Active Bankers
Sector Rating
Credit Direction
1988 1989 1990
actual actual forecast
7.5 3.9 1.7
+26% -48% -56%
46
29
13
Aaa
Stable
15
15
7
AaaStable
8
8
5
Aaa
Stable
15/
1988
Number of Issues 1988-1990
SOURCE: Moody's Annual Report, supra note 13
(reprinted with Moody's permission).
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1988 1989 1990
actual actual forecast
Australia
TRENDS
Volume($BI) 0.9 1.6 2.5
%Change NA +92.0% +56.2%
Issues 17 28 36
Issuers 7 10 15
Active Bankers 7 10 15
Credit Direction NA NA Higher
(ASMil)
FANMAC
MGICA
McCaughan Dyson
Victorian Housing
NNMC
SecPac
State Bank NSW
Town & Country
Capel Court r
o 200 400 600 800 1000 1200 1400 1600 1800
Australian Mortgage-Backed Securities
Outstanding Volume by Issuer
SOURCE: Moody's Annual Report, supra note 13
(reprinted with Moody's permission).
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United Kingdom
TRENDS
Volume(£Bil)
%Change
Issues
Issuers
Active Bankers
Sector Rating
Credit Direction
1988 1989 1990
actual actual forecast
I_/_/
2.9
+192%
16
8
4
Aaa
Stable
2.9
0%
14
8
6
Aaa
Stable
= Total Volume m Top Four Issuers
1987 195B
3.0
+3%
15
11
5
Aaa
Stable
(xHI1)
1959
1987-1989 Market Concentration
SOURCE: Moody's Annual Report, supra note 13
(reprinted with Moody's permission).
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II. RULE 144A AND RELATED DEVELOPMENTS
A. Rule 144A
Rule 144A"°0 is an exemption for the resale of restricted
securities from the section 5101 registration requirements of the
Securities Act."° Only resales of such securities to "qualified
institutional buyers" fall within the safe harbor provided by the
rule.'0 3 The provisions of Rule 144A are examined generally,
below, with particular reference to their applicability to debt and
asset-backed securities.
Rule 144A is a non-exclusive exemption from registration
which may be used by persons other than the issuer. The rule may
100. 17 C.F.R. § 230.144A (1990). Rule 144A was proposed in October 1988. Sec. Act Release
No. 33-6806, 42 SEC Docket 76 (CCH) (Oct. 25, 1988), 53 Fed. Reg. 44,016 (Nov. 1, 1988), [1988
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L Rep. (CCH) 84,335 [hereinafter Proposing Release]. The Rule
attracted substantial comment and was reproposed in significantly modified form in July 1989 after
a SEC hearing. Sec. Act Release No. 33-6839,43 SEC Docket 2027 (CCH) (July 11, 1989), 54 Fed.
Reg. 30,076 (July 18, 1989), [1989-90 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 84,427
[hereinafter Reproposing Release]. On April 19, 1990, after further changes, the Commission adopted
Rule 144A in final form. Sec. Act Release No. 33-6862, 46 SEC Docket 26 (CCH) (Apr. 23, 1990),
55 Fed. Reg. 17,933 (Apr. 30, 1990), [1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 84,523
(codified at 17 C.F.R. § 230.144A (1991)) [hereinafter Adopting Release]. In addition to the
references to the Adopting Release, the overview of Rule 144A in Section In draws generally on the
Adopting Release. The proposed and reproposed version of the rule are described in L. Loss & J.
SELIGMAN, SECURITIES REGULATION 180-87 (3d ed. 1989).
The economic policy considerations underlying Rule 144A vis-fi-vis the market dominance of
institutional investors and the growth of private placement activity are the subject of an extensive
analysis in Note, The Capital Markets in Transition, supra note 69. The background of Rule 144A
and a description of its development by one of its chief architects appears in Hanks, Rule 1444:
Another Cabbage In The Chop Suey, 24 GEo. WASH. J. INT'L L. & EcON. 305 (1990). See also M.
POLLOCK, RESALES OF RESTRICTED SEcuRITEs UNDER SEC RULES 144 AND 144A, 46-2nd C. P.
S., at A-23 through A-30 (BNA 1990); Berkeley & Minarick, New Rule 1444: Institutional Trading
of Privately Placed Securities, PRAC. L INST., ADVANCED SEC. L. WORKSHOP, 1990, at 47; Cooper,
Rule 144A and Regulation S Under the Securities Act of 1933, PRAC. L INST., INSTITUTIONAL
INVESTORS 353 (1990) (all sources containing detailed descriptions of Rule 144A). For a summary
treatment of the Rule and comments on its adoption, see Barron, Some Comments on SEC Rule 144A,
18 SEC. REG. L. J. 400 (1991). For additional discussion regarding Rule 144A, see generally H.
BLOOMENTHAL, 3A SECURITIES AND FEDERAL CORPORATE LAw Ch. 4A (1991); C. JOHNSON,
CORPORATE FINANCE AND THE SECURmES LAWS 353-57 (1990); T. Gilroy & E. Kaufmann,
SECURmas LAW TECHNIQUES: TRANSACnONS, LMOATION Ch. 39 (A.A. Sommer, Jr., ed. 1991).
101. 15 U.S.C. § 77e (1988).
102. 15 U.S.C. § 77a-77bbbb (1988) [hereinafter the Securities Act].
103. Rule 144A(d)(1); Rule 144A(a).
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be seen as a partial codification of "section 4(1 1/2)" practice 104
in which non-issuer holders engage in unregistered sales in reliance
on the exemptions from registration provided by section 4(1)15
of the Securities Act for transactions by persons other than issuers,
underwriters, or dealers, and by section 4(2)"°) of the Act for
issuer transactions not involving a public offering. Engrafted on to
section 4(1) by counsel have been the Supreme Court's criteria,
first articulated in SEC v. Ralston Purina Co.,107 under which the
seller in a private transaction has the burden of demonstrating that
the purchaser is sufficiently sophisticated to evaluate and bear a
security's risk, and is acquiring it for investment purposes and not
104. Section 4(1 112) has never been explicitly approved by the Securities and Exchange
Commission. See Bloomenthal, The SEC And Internationalization Of Capital Markets: Herein Of
Regulation S And Rule 144A, 18 DEN. 3. INT'L L & POL'Y 83, 112 n.159 (1989) (discussing the
genesis of § 4(1 1/2) in the context of proposed and reproposed Regulation S and Rule 144A). See
generally J. HicKs, RESALES OF RESTRICTED SECURmES 475-519 (1990) (analyzing case law relating
to § 4(1 1/2); Schneider, Section 4(1 1/2) - Private Resales of Restricted or Control Securities, 49
OHIo ST. L. J. 501 (1988) (analyzing use of§ 4( 11/2) exemption with reference to competing policy
considerations); STUDY GROUP ON RESALES OF DEBT SECURIIES, ABA COMMITEE ON
DEVELOPMENTS IN BusiNEss FINANciNO, Resale by Institutional Investors of Debt Securities
Acquired in Private Placements, 34 Bus. LAw. 1927, 1959 (1979) (stating that § 4(1 1/2) supports
"broader types" of private resales).
105. 15 U.S.C. § 77d(1) (1988). Congressman John D. Dingell (D.-Mich.) (Chairman, House
Committee on Energy and Commerce) and Edward J. Markey (D.-Mass.) (Chairman, House
Subcommittee on Telecommunications and Finance) have been highly critical of the SEC's adoption
of Rule 144A. Letter to SEC Chairman Richard C. Breedon from Congressman John D. Dinzell
Chairman, House Committee on Energy and Commerce and Congressman Edward J. Markey,
Chairman, House Subcommittee on Telecommunications and Finance, reprinted in [1990 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L Rep. (CCH) 1 84,600. While supporting the policy goals underlying the rule,
they have argued that the SEC has exceeded the scope of its powers in adopting Rule 144A and that
the rule itself may be ultra vires, and resulted in the creation of a two-tiered trading market system.
Id. at 80,695. See U.S. CONGRESS, OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, Electronic Bulls and
Bears: U.S. Securities Markets and Information Technology, OTA-CIT-469 (Sept. 1990), at 58.
Compare Hanks, supra note 100, at 331 (to the extent Rule 144A is ultra vires because of the lack
of mandated information disclosure about the issuer, then Rule 506 of Regulation D is even more so
because it is less well grounded in case law). The SEC is to report to Congress on the use of Rule
144A at six-month intervals. [1990 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 80,696. Cong.
Dingell reacted negatively to the SEC's fit report. DingelU. Cram It, Quinn: Expand It, supra note
69.
106. 15 U.S.C. § 77d(2) (1988).
107. 346 U.S. 119 (1953).
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with a view towards distribution." 8 The concern with the nature
of the prospective purchaser is carried forward in Rule 144A and
is its central focus.
As noted above, Rule 144A is not available for transactions by
issuers, which must place their securities in reliance on section
4(2), Regulation D 9, another exemption from legislation, as
Regulation S."' Under Rule 144A, purchasers of restricted
securities may resell11 them immediately upon acquisition in
private secondary markets n1 2 to qualified institutional buyers.
1. Eligible Securities
Securities eligible for resale under Rule 144A are those which
are not of the same class as securities listed on a United States
108. Id. at 126. In Ralston Purina, the Court rejected the issuers argument that the offer of its
securities to -key" employees, a group which was dermed to include low-level markets, was a
private offering exempt under § 4(2). Id. at 125-26. The Court reasoned that the applicability of §
4(2) should depend on whether the offerees are sophisticated and have access to the information
necessary to assess a security's merits and risks, thus obviating the need for protection under the Act.
Id. at 124-27. Section 2(l1) of the Securities Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77b(1 1) (1988), defines an underwriter
as one who acquires securities from an issuer or affiliate of an issuer with a view to distribution, Le.,
a public offering.
109. 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.501-508 (1990).
110. In Securities Industry Association, SEC No-Action Letter, [current] Fed. Sec. L Rep.
(CCH) 79,729 (April 25, 1991) the Commission granted exemptions from Exchange Act Rule 10b-
6 (antimanipulation) and Rule 10b-7 (stabilization restrictions) to allow transactions outside the
United States when foreign securities are being offered and sold to QIBs in the United States
pursuant to Section 4(2), Regulation D or Rule 144A. The exemptions are subject to the following
conditions, among others:
(i) the non-U.S. transactions must be effected on the International Stock exchange (on
the Stock Exchange Automated Quotation (SEAQ) or SEAQ International Systems),
or on the Montreal, Paris, Tokyo or Toronto Stock Exchanges;
(ii) the issuer must have a minimum operating history of three years;
(iii) the exemptions are restricted to distributions in the U.S. of foreign securities whose
principal market is outside the U.S.
Id
111. Rule 144A(b). See Preliminary Note 7 to Rule 144A.
112. In conjunction with its adoption of Rule 144A, the SEC recently approved PORTAL, an
automated trading system for restricted securities which will be operated by the National Association
of Securities Dealers, Inc. See infra notes 160-170 and accompanying text (discussing PORTAL). The
New York and American Stock Exchanges are establishing similar systems. See infra note 161 and
accompanying text.
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securities exchange or quoted in an inter-dealer quotation
system. 13  With respect to debt instruments, including
asset-backed securities, the Commission's position is that new
issues of securities having such characteristics as interest rates,
maturities, and collateral and which are "substantially identical"
to those of publicly-traded securities are considered fungible and
therefore ineligible for resale under Rule 144A.1 4 Separate series
of debt securities are considered different classes under the
rule. 115
2. Purchasers
Sales under Rule 144A may be made only to qualified
institutional buyers (QIBs) or their agents 1 6  Qualified
institutional buyers are defined generally as corporations or
113. Rule 144A(d)(3)(i). In certain quarters, one of the chief concerns associated with the
formulation of Rule 144A has been the potential development of parallel public and private trading
markets in the same securities. Division of Corporation Finance Summary of Commentators' Remarks
(File No. 57-23-28, May 3, 1989); Hanks, Ru/e 144A: Easing Restrictons On Trading Unregistered
Securities, N.Y.L., May 10, 1990, at 5, col. 1. The SEC's view was that restricted securities'
liquidity premiums would lessen the attraction into private markets of securities trading in public
markets. Id. at 6. The restriction of Rule 144A to non-fungible (the term fungible does not appear
in the Rule, although the Commission uses it in the Adopting Release) securities reflects the position
of the New York Stock Exchange, among others. Id. Under Rule 144A, if the value of a common
stock rises above the 10% premium level of the security convertible into it, see infra note 115,
conversions will follow resulting in the same securities being traded on public and private markets.
Id. Because fungibility is measured at the time of issuance, parallel trading may also occur if an
issuer registers securities which are currently trading pursuant to Rule 144A. Id The amendment of
Rule 144, see infra notes 147-152, to permit tacking of holding periods will accelerate the flow of
restricted securities into public trading markets and should diminish the amount of parallel trading.
Id
114. Adopting Release, supra note 100, at 80,640.
115. Id. Equity securities are considered to be of the same class if they are substantially similar
in character and confer comparable rights on holders. Id. Preferred securities are deemed to be of the
same class if their terms are substantially identical. Id Convertible securities are deemed to be both
the convertible and underlying securities unless they are the subject of an effective conversion
premium of no less than 10% when initially issued. Ikd With respect to American depository receipt
(ADR) shares listed on a U.S. securities exchange or on NASDAQ, the underlying shares are viewed
as trading publicly and therefore, as securities of the same class as the ADRs, such underlying shares
would not be eligible for resale under Rule 144A. Id.
116. Rule 144A(d)(1). The Division of Corporation Finance recently indicated that sellers may
rely on Standard & Poor's list of QIBs. STANDARD & PooR's CoRP. (July 8, 1991) (File No. 801-
3981).
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partnerships owning and investing on a discretionary basis a
minimum of $100 million in securities of non-affiliated
entities."' In the case of federally insured banks and thrift
institutions, such institutions are additionally required to have an
audited net worth of not less than $25 million.118 An exception
to the $100 million requirement exists for Exchange Act registered
broker-dealers which must own and exercise investment discretion
over at least $10 million worth of securities of issuers not affiliated
with the broker-dealer.11 9 Broker-dealers are also classified as
QIBs when acting on behalf of other such buyers in riskless
principal transactions or when acting as agents on a
non-di scretionary basis.12 0 Broker-dealer affiliates of depository
institutions are not subject to the $25 million net worth
requirement.121
Aggregation of wholly- and majority-owned subsidiary holdings
is permitted for purposes of meeting the $100 million requirement
on the condition that the investments are controlled by a common
117. Rule 144A(a)(1)(i). Rule 144A as initially proposed provided for three tiers of qualified
buyers. Proposing Release, supra note 100, at 89,540-46. A qualified institutional buyer was defined
as one having $100 million or more in assets (on a consolidated basis). lt Two additional classes
of qualified buyers were required to have a minimum of $5 million in assets and permitted to invest
in securities of SEC reporting issuers or any securities subject to certain resale restrictions. Id When
Rule 144A was reproposed in 1989, a qualified institutional buyer was defined as an entity owning
or having under management $100 million or more in securities; the second and third buyer tiers
were dropped. Reproposing Release, supra note 100, at 80,221, 80,224.
118. Rule 144A(a)(1)(vi). The $25 million net worth requirement did not appear in the
proposed and reproposed versions of the rule. The SEC is soliciting comment on the appropriateness
of the requirement. Adopting Release, supra note 100, at 80,638, 80,642.
119. Rule 144A(a)(1)(ii). Securities held by a broker-dealer in its investment and trading
accounts, such as market-making inventories, are considered to be owned by it. ld. Unsold public
offering allotments are not deemed to be owned by the broker-dealer. Id. Section 4(3) of the
Securities Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77d(3) (1988), exempts dealer transactions from Section 5 registration
requirements except when dealers are participants in a distribution or for a specified period after the
securities are first offered to the public. A dealer complying with Rule 144A will not be considered
to be a participant in a distribution, and thus not be deemed to be an underwriter because the
securities will not be deemed to have been offered publicly. Rule 144A(c); Adopting Release, supra
note 100, at 80,639.
120. Rule 144A(a)(1)(iii). A riskless principal transaction is defined in Rule 144A as one in
which a dealer buys a security from any person and makes a simultaneous offsetting sale to a QIB,
including another dealer acting as riskless principal for a QIB. Rule 144A(a)(5).
121. Adopting Release, supra note 100, at 80,642.
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parent. 122 The separate assets of a "family of investment
companies" headed by a common investment advisor are made
explicitly eligible for aggregative treatment." The value of
securities held is determined according to the basis of acquisition
cost, except when the buyer's financial statements report holdings
on a market value basis.12
4
Noteworthy with respect to calculation of the $100 million
qualifying amount is the Commission's decision to exclude from
the definition of security under Rule 144A only, securities issued
by the United States and its instrumentalities and, inter alia,
certificates of deposit, loan participations, and repurchase
agreements."z The Commission's position, in conjunction with
the $25 million net worth requirement for depository institutions,
is designed to limit depository institution participation and exposure
in Rule 144A transactions. 126  However, a more equitable
restriction on depository institution transactions under Rule 144A,
which would be consistent with the goal of increasing private
secondary market liquidity, might be a requirement restricting such
institutions' acquisitions of non-investment grade securities.
Sellers must reasonably believe that prospective purchasers are
qualified institutional buyers. 27 The non-exclusive alternative
sources of information for satisfying this requirement are the
122. Rule 144A(a)(4).
123. Rule 144A(a)(1)(iv).
124. Adopting Release, supra note 100, at 80,644.
125. In UNUM Life Insurance Co., (Nov. 21, 1990), 1990 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 1250, the
Commission's staff stated explicitly its view that securities issued or guaranteed by the U.S.
Department of Housing and Urban Development, FNMA, FHLMC and the Student Loan Marketing
Association are excluded from the calculation of securities owned and invested on a discretionary
basis under Rule 144A(a)(2). Ia The Staff also indicated its position that securities which must be
registered under the Securities Act of 1933 and which are secured by, or represent an individual
interest in a pool of mortgages or commercial receivables are eligible to be counted as securities
owned and invested on a discretionary basis, even if the assets underlying the pool are issued or
guaranteed by the federal government or one of its instrumentalities. Il
126. In addition to the thrift industry debacle, recent concern about potential adverse
developments in the U.S. banking industry suggest the SEC's concern may also be well founded with
respect to banks' participation in Rule 144A transactions. See, e.g., Bates, Banks Losing Credibility,
ChiefRegulator Says, L.A. Times, Oct. 24, 1990, § D, at 1, col. 5; Gonzalez, Dark Clouds and a
Deep Sleep, L.A. Times, Oct. 26, 1990, § B, at 11, col. 3 (op. ed.).
127. Rule 144A(d)(1).
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buyer's most current annual financial statements, its most recent
filing with a governmental or self-regulatory organization, the latest
data contained in a recognized securities manual, or the buyer's
representation that it meets or exceeds the $100 million
threshold."n Sellers are required to inform purchasers that the
sale may be made in reliance on Rule 144A.'29 Qualified
institutional buyers are restricted to acquiring securities under the
rule solely for their own account or for the accounts of other such
buyers.1 3
0
3. Information Requirement
Rule 144A does not require that any information about the
issuer be disclosed except where the issuer neither reports under
the Exchange Act nor files home country reports with the SEC
pursuant to Rule 12g3-2(b)."l Upon the request of prospective
buyers and securities holders, non-filing issuers must furnish
prospective buyers, as well as holders, a "very brief" description
of the issuer's principal products and services and three years'
financial statements."'
128. Rule 144A(d)(l)(i)-(iv).
129. Rule 144A(d)(2).
130. Rule 144A(d)(1); Rule 144A(a)(1); Adopting Release, supra note 100, at 80,645. The QIB
definition has been subjected to considerable criticism. Longstreth, Beckman & Rich, Rule 144A: A
Closer Look, 4 INsIGHTS: CORP. & SEc. L. ADvisoR 16, 19-21 (Aug. 1990) [hereinafter Longstreth];
McLaughlin, Identifying "'QIBs'" Under SEC Rule 144A, N.Y.U. 5, col. I (Sept. 20, 1990).
131. Rule 144A(d)(4)(i); 17 C.F.R. § 240.12g3-2(b) (1990). Under Rule 12g3-2 a foreign issuer
which has not made a public offering in the U.S. is exempt from Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-
78kk (1988), registration and reporting requirements if it has fewer than 300 U.S. resident
shareholders or files with the SEC and makes publicly available that information which it is required
to furnish the exchange on which its securities are traded. Securities of foreign issuers exempt
pursuant to Rule 12g3-2(b) had not been permitted to be traded on NASDAQ. See Sec. Exeh. Act
Release No. 34-20264 (OcL 6, 1983), [1983-84 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 183,435.
See generally Hanks & Bushner, Rule 12g3-2(b): Backdoor or Trapdoor?, 10 NT'L FIN. L. Rnv. 36
(Apr. 1991) (discussing relationship of Rule 12g3-2(b) to Rule 144A and ADRs). In conjunction with
the Commission's approval of the NASD's PORTAL system, see infra notes 160-170 and
accompanying text, it has allowed foreign PORTAL-traded issuers to retain their Rule 12g3-2(b)
exemption. 55 Fed. Reg. 18,781, 18,789 (May 4, 1991).
132. Rule 144A(d)(4)(i),(ii). It is on the issue of mandated information disclosure that
Commissioner Fleischman dissented from the Commission's final version of Rule 144A. Adopting
Release, supra note 100, at 80,657. He argues persuasively that such disclosure is inconsistent with
the policy implicit in the rule of allowing QIBs to fend for themselves by using their bargaining
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Asset-backed securities are dealt with specifically in the
Release.'33 According to the SEC, under Rule 144A the servicer
or trustee of the entity holding title to the assets is deemed to be
the "issuer" of the securities. 34 The SEC staff has indicated that
such entities are considered issuers only for the purpose of
identifying the party which must disclose information in
compliance with the Rule 144A(d)(4)(ii) information
requirement. 135  The SEC staff considers the information
requirement to be satisfied by providing a description of the
securities' structure and distribution schedule, data relating to
underlying asset performance, and credit enhancement.
3 6
With respect to issuer-related disclosure matters generally, the
effectiveness of the rule in promoting the development and
liquidity of private secondary markets depends significantly on the
amount of information which is demanded by prospective buyers,
in addition to that which may have been previously furnished
pursuant to Rule 144A or which is otherwise available. In his
partial dissent from Rule 144A Commissioner Fleischman predicted
that the rule's disclosure requirement would impede resales."s
However, buyers are free to and may demand more or different
information than is publicly available, regardless of Rule 144A.
Thus, the extent to which buyers insist on additional information
will similarly have a negative impact on market liquidity.
power. Id. The effect ofrequired disclosure will be to disproportionately encumber development stage
issuers and encumber resales. Id. at 80,658. This concern may also be appropriate in light of the
absence of any cap on the amount of information QIBs may demand. Id. at 80,657-61. The
information requirement may be the rule's most controversial element. The exposure of issuers to the
liability created by the requirement may act as a substantial disincentive for foreign issuers which
might otherwise want their securities to be traded in the 144A market.
133. Adopting Release, supra note 100, at 80,646.
134. Id.
135. Mortgage-backed and Asset-backed Securities, SecuritiesAct Release No. 6862- The Rule
144A Release (Nov. 29, 1990) (1990 SEC No-Aci LEXIS 1273). The staff stated that Rule 144A's
information requirement was not intended to cause any change in the analysis of an entity's issuer
status under the federal securities laws for privately placed ABSs than in public offerings of such
securities. Id
136. Adopting Release, supra note 100, at 80,646.
137. Id. at 80,656.
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4. Resales
As indicated above, sellers must take reasonable measures to
ensure that the buyer has notice that the seller may be relying on
Rule 144A. 3 ' Buyers may freely resell restricted securities within
the confines of the rule or pursuant to another exemption from
registration.
139
5. Investment Companies; Broker-Dealer Net Capital
Requirements
Open-end (mutual) funds are subject to stringent limitations on
investments in restricted securities."4 The SEC has traditionally
viewed such securities as illiquid."' However, in an action which
may stimulate private secondary markets, the Commission has
ceded to fund directors the discretion to determine the liquidity of
Rule 144A securities. 42 In this regard, the Commission has taken
138. Jd at 80,646. See Federal Securities Regulation Subcommittee an Annual Review,
Significant 1990 Legislative and Regulatory Developments, 43 BUs. LAw 973, 984 (1991) (stating
that "reasonable steps" taken to ensure Rule 144A buyer awareness likely to become "standard
disclosure" in private placement documentation").
139. Rule 144A(e). See infra notes 147-52 and accompanying text (discussing Rule 144, 17
C.F.R. § 230.144 (1990), which was amended concurrently with the adoption of Rule 144A to allow
tacking of holding periods pursuant to the Rule 144 two- and three-year holding period requirements).
Rule 144A does not address the extent of an issuer's liability, if any, for resales of its securities in
violation of the rule's provisions e.g., sales to non-QIBs. Longstreth, supra note 130, at 16-18. See
also sources cited supra note 138 (discussing, inter alia, Rule 144A resale liability).
140. Sections 4(2) and 5(a)(1) of the Investment Company Act of 1940,15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-4(2),
80a-5(a)(1) (1988).
141. Investment Co. Act Release No. 40-5847 (Oct. 21, 1969), 35 Fed. Reg. 1989 (Dec. 31,
1970).
142. Adopting Release, supra note 100, at 80,647-48.The release lists as non-exhaustive factors
bearing on liquidity determinations the following:
(1) The frequency of trades and quotes for the security;
(2) the number of dealers willing to purchase or sell the security and the number of other
potential purchasers;
(3) dealer undertakings to make a market in the security; and
(4) the nature of the security and the nature of the marketplace trades (e.g., the time
needed to dispose of the security, the method of soliciting offers, and the mechanics of
transfer).
Id. See Mahoney, supra note 3, at 69 (stating that mutual funds may be one of the principal
"tmintentional" beneficiaries of Rule 144A).
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the position that an illiquid security is one that cannot be disposed
of within seven days at a price related to the holder's valuation of
the security. 43 Should active secondary markets develop for Rule
144A non-investment grade debt consistent with portfolio theory,
the Commission's view of liquidity with respect to investment
company holdings may conflict with its position on liquidity
vis-i-vis broker-dealer net capital requirements.
With respect to liquidity determinations pursuant to the
broker-dealer Uniform Net Capital Rule,1" it may be inferred
from the Release that non-investment grade domestic and foreign
corporate debt will be excluded from broker-dealer asset
calculations.'45 It is reasonable to assume that the Commission
will extend its interpretation of corporate debt to include
asset-backed securities which are commonly issued by grantor
trusts and special purpose partnerships as well as corporations. The
Commission's stance is intended to minimize broker-dealer
exposure in 144A markets. However, one effect of the SEC's
position on net capital liquidity may be to further limit the
participation of moderately-sized, and often more entrepreneurial,
broker-dealers and issuers in the evolution of asset-backed markets,
most particularly, development of markets for non-investment grade
ABSs. 146
143. Investment Co. Act Release No. 40-14983 (Mar. 12, 1986), [1985-86 Transfer Binder]
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 183,972 (adopting amendments to Rule 2a-7, 17 C.F.R. § 270.2a-7 (1990)).
144. 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-1 (1990). See generally Molinari & Kibler, Broker-Dealers'
Financial Responsibility Under The Uniform Net Capital Rule - A Case For Liquidity, 72 GEO. L
J. 1, 18 (1983) (stating that Net Capital Rule's emphasis on liquidity is the most effective method
for ensuring broker dealer stability and investor protection). The Commission recently amended the
Net Capital Rule to tighten restrictions on withdrawals of equity capital. Sec. Exch. Act Release No.
34-28927, 46 SEC Docket 573 (CCH) (Feb. 28, 1991), 56 Fed. Reg. 9124 (Mar. 5, 1991), [1990
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 84,713 (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-1
(1991)).
145. Adopting Release, supra note 100, at 80,648-49.
146. But see Salwen & Mitchell, SEC May Control Market In Asset-Backed Securities, Wall
St. J., June 28, 1991, at 1, col. 3 (discussing possible limitation of ABS pools to investment grade
debt); L. BRYAN, supra note 27, at 165-167 (recent shrinkage of junk bond market related to thrift
industry crisis will reduce demand for securitization of assets which are not "high quality").
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B. Rule 144 Amendments
Holders of restricted securities 147  have traditionally been
required to retain them for a minimum of two years before sales
could be made in reliance on Rule 144."' Tacking the holding
periods of prior holders to that of the seller generally has not been
permitted.149 With its adoption of Rule 144A, the Commission
has determined to allow tacking generally, both for Rule 144A and
other restricted securities.! The holding periods for all restricted
securities run from the date they were last acquired from the issuer
or an affiliate of the issuer. 5 ' Thus, the securities of reporting
issuers can generally trade freely two years after issue, and those
of non-reporting issuers and Rule 12g3-2(b) exempt foreign issuers
may do so three years after the first sale. 5
2
C. Regulation TAmendments
Foreign securities generally are not freely tradable on U.S.
markets and, under Regulation T, had not been eligible for
treatment as marginable securities. 53 The restrictions on trading
of foreign securities on U.S. markets have had a negative impact
on U.S. broker-dealers' net capital and have inhibited U.S.
transactions in foreign securities.'54 The SEC has sought to
147. Prior to the adoption of Rule 144A, a restricted security had been defined in Rule
144(a)(3) as a security acquired from an issuer or affiliate of an issuer in a transaction not involving
a public offering. Id. With the advent of Rule 144A, the Rule 144 definition has been amended to
include securities acquired in Rule 144A transactions. 17 C.F.R. § 230.144(a)(3)(iv) (1991).
148. Rule 144(d)(1). There is a three-year holding period for current and certain former issuer
affiliates and for non-Exchange Act reporting and exempt foreign issuers. Id.; Rule 144(k).
149. Sec. Act Release No. 33-5223, (Jan. 11, 1972), [1971 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L Rep.
(CCH) 78,487. Previously, tacking holding periods had been permitted only where tie holder
acquired the security pursuant to a pledge, gift, trust, or estate. Rule 144(d)(4).
150. Rule 144(d),(k); Adopting Release, supra note 100, at 80,649. See Austin & Peters,
Resales of Securities Under Rule 144, in PRAc. L INsT., SEc. FILINos 1990 REv. AND UPDATE 451,
468-86 (1990); PoLLocK, supra note 100, at A-1 through A-22 (both sources discussing new tacking
provisions and other aspects of amended Rule 144).
151. Rule 144(d)(1).
152. Karmel, New Rules for Trading Foreign Securities, N.Y.L.J., June 28, 1990, 3, 6, col. 1.
153. Id.
154. Id.
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alleviate this situation by stating that foreign securities held in
broker-dealer proprietary accounts for resale are considered liquid
if they are: (1) Debt securities of a foreign issuer not traded flat or
in default as to principal or interest, which were issued publicly in
a principal foreign securities market by a government or
multi-governmental organization; (2) debt securities of a foreign
issuer not traded flat or in default as to principal or interest, which
were issued publicly in a principal foreign securities market and
which have been rated in one of the four top rating categories by
at least two nationally recognized U.S. statistical rating
organizations (NSRO); or (3) securities of a foreign issuer which
were issued publicly in a principal foreign securities market and
which are listed on one of the major money markets outside the
United States. 55
In recognition of the fact that foreign clearance and settlement
procedures are often more lengthy than the Regulation T seven day
settlement requirement for non-marginable securities, 15 6 the
Federal Reserve Board recently amended Regulation T to provide
that foreign securities purchases must be settled within seven days
or on the date required by the foreign securities market, but in no
event later than thirty-five days after execution.157 The Board has
also allowed broker-dealers to extend margin credit on specified
foreign debt and equity securities which had previously been
permitted only for exchange listed and designated NASDAQ
securities.' 58 Under Regulation T, foreign debt securities are
eligible for margin treatment if (1) there was a principal amount
outstanding of no less than $100 million on the date of initial
issuance; (2) at the time the broker-dealer extends margin credit it
155. Adopting Release, supra note 100, at 80,648-49.
156. 12 C.F.R. § 220.8(b)(1)(i) (1990); Karmel, supra note 152, at 6, col. I (discussing
Regulation T amendments).
157. 12 C.F.R. § 220.8(b)(1)(ii) (1991).
158. 12 C.F.R. § 220.2(t)(5) (1991) (relating to debt); 12 C.F.R. § 220(0),0) (1991) (relating
to equity).
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reasonably believes that the issuer is not in default of principal and
interest; and (3) a NSRO has rated the issue in one of the two
highest rating categories.' 59
D. PORTAL1' °
In conjunction with the SEC's adoption of Rule 144A, the
Commission also approved a proposal by the National Association
of Securities Dealers, Inc. (NASD) to establish a computerized
system for the primary placement and secondary trading of Rule
144A securities.' 6' PORTAL is a screen-based quotation, trading,
159. 12 C.F.R. § 220.2(t)(5) (1991).
160. PORTAL is an acronym for Private Offerings, Resales and Trading Through Automated
Linkage.
161. Sec. Exch. Act Release No. 34-27956 (Apr. 27, 1990),55 Fed. Reg. 18,781 (May4, 1990)
[hereinafter PORTAL Release]. In its PORTAL Release, the SEC approved the NASD's new
Schedule I [hereinafter the PORTAL Rules] to its Bylaws. See File No. SR NASD-88-23; NASD
Manual 1990 Schedule I to the Bylaws (CCH) 1951-79. See also Bloomenthal, Rule 144A and the
PORTAL Market, 12 SEc. & FED. CoRp. L. REP. 145, 149-50 (describing PORTAL as a "careful.
. . if not overcautious" system). See generally Rothwell, The Evolution of the Portal Market, 4
INSIGHTS: CORP. & SEC. L. ADVISOR 3 (Oct. 1990) (describing changes in PORTAL rules in response
to amendments to Rule 144A; criticizing, inter alia, the SEC's requirement that the NASD maintain
tight restrictions on exit of securities from PORTAL, in contrast to Rule 144A's lack of similar
restrictions on resales outside PORTAL; and stating that the Commission's refusal to restrict Rule
144A transactions to "sealed" markets such as PORTAL may lead to unregulated leakage of
restricted securities into public markets); Rothwell, The New Market For Institutional Trading: The
PORTAL Market, in PRAC. L INST., PRIVATE PLACEMENTS AFTER RULE 144A 131 (1990)
(containing detailed description of PORTAL).
Initial response of broker-dealers and institutional investors to PORTAL has been limited.
Gillen, NASD System for Private Placement Draws Yawns From Market Participants, BOND BUYER
Dec. 14, 1990, at 3. The mediocre response is, in part, a reflection of poor market conditions
generally. See infra notes 295-99 and 317-18 and accompanying text (market's initial response to
Rule 144A). In order to encourage use, the NASD has sought SEC approval to convert PORTAL to
an "open" trading system, dropping certain requirements including that NASD members prequalify
with the NASD as QIBs, and permitting members to conduct Rule 144A transactions outside of
PORTAL. NASD Proposes Converting Its System For Rule 144A To Open Trading System, SEC. REG.
& L. REP. (BNA), Feb. 15, 1991, at 7.
The American and New York Stock Exchanges are establishing competing systems: SITUS
(System for Institutional Trading of Unregistered Securities) and NYSE System 144A, respectively.
See Securities, NYSE Proposes Creation of New System For Buying, Selling Rule 144A Stocks, Daily
Report For Executives (BNA), Sept. 14, 1990, at A-2.
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clearing, and settlement system for U.S. and foreign equity and
debt securities. 62
To become eligible for trading on PORTAL securities must be
approved in accordance with PORTAL Rules, be eligible for sale
pursuant to Rule 144A,' 63 and be deposited with designated
depository organizations.' In order to participate in PORTAL,
investors, dealers, and brokers must comply with registration
criteria.165 Investors and dealers must be eligible to purchase Rule
144A securities by having QIB status under the rule.1" Brokers
are prohibited from executing transactions on the PORTAL market
as principals.' 67
To inhibit leakage of PORTAL securities into public trading
markets, securities may be transferred out of the PORTAL system
only via "qualified exit transactions.' 68  A qualified exit
transaction is defined as: (1) A transaction registered pursuant to
the Securities Act; (2) a transaction exempt from registration under
Regulation S, or Rules 144A or 145; (3) a repurchase by the issuer
or an affiliate; (4) a transaction exempt under Rule 144A based on
counsel's opinion reviewed by the NASD in advance of the
transaction; 69 or (5) a demonstrably exempt transaction resulting
in the purchaser acquiring freely-tradable securities.17
162. Clearance and settlement may be made in U.S. dollars and numerous foreign currencies
through two designated depository institutions, the Depository Trust Company (DTC) and Centrale
de Livraison de Valeurs Mobilieres S.A. Luxembourg (CEDEL). 55 Fed. Reg. 18,783-86 (May 4,
1990) (relating to foreign securities).
163. PORTAL Rules, Pt. II, § 2(a)(1). Securities can be traded in the PORTAL market without
the issuer's consent. 55 Fed. Reg. 18,782 (May 4, 1990).
164. PORTAL Rules, Pt. II, § 2(a)(3). See supra note 162 (identifying depositories).
165. PORTAL Rules, Pt. IV (relating to investors); id Pt. III (relating to dealers).
166. Md Pt. IV, § 1(b)(1) (relating to investors); Pt. III, § 1(b)(1) (relating to dealers).
167. Id Pt. III, § 3. All brokers and dealers must be NASD members as a condition of
participating in PORTAL Id PL III, § 2(b) (relating to brokers); id. Pt. Ill, § l(b)(2) (relating to
dealers). PORTAL participants must be members of DTC or CEDEL and PORTAL accounts must
be maintained separately from participants' other accounts at those depositories. Id PL HI, § 2(b)
(relating to brokers); id. Pt. Ill, § 1(b)(3) (relating to dealers).
168. Id Pt. 1, § 18.
169. Id Pt. I, § 18(b)(4).
170. Id Pt. I, § 18(c).
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IV. REGULATION S
In adopting Regulation S,17 1  the SEC has attempted to
rationalize the extraterritorial reach of the registration provisions of
U.S. securities laws. The Commission's traditional position has
been that the Securities Act's section 5 registration requirements do
not apply to offers and sales of securities under circumstances
which result in the securities "coming to rest abroad." 17 2 In
numerous no-action letters over the years, the SEC staff has
approved a variety of procedures173 to ensure that securities were
171. 17 C.F.R. § 230.901-904. Regulation S was proposed by the Commission in June 1988
to replace Sec. Act Release No. 33-4708., See infra note 172. Sec. Act Release No. 33-6779,41 SEC
Docket 126 (CCH) (June 10, 1988), 53 Fed. Reg. 22,661 (June 17, 1988), [1987-88 Transfer Binder]
Fed. Sec. L Rep. (CCHi) '184,242 [hereinafter Regulation S Proposing Release]. It was reproposed
one year later in revised form. Sec. Act Release No. 33-6838,43 SEC Docket 2008 (CCIl) (July 11,
1989), 54 Fed. Reg. 30,063 (July 18, 1989), [1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1
84,426 [hereinafter Regulation S Reproposing Release]. The Commission adopted Regulation S on
April 19, 1990. Sec. Act Release No. 33-6863, 46 SEC Docket 52 (CCH) (Apr. 24, 1990), 55 Fed.
Reg. 18,306 (May 2, 1990), [1989-90 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 84,524 (to be
codified at 17 C.F.R. § 230.901-904 (1990)) [hereinafter Regulation S Adopting Release]. In addition
to references to the Regulation S Adopting Release, the text's overview of Regulation S draws
generally on that Adopting Release.
Professors Loss and Seligman describe the proposed and reproposed versions of Regulation S
in Loss & SEmGMAN, supra note 100, at 64-76. For an overview and further discussion regarding
Regulation S, see generally R. Adler, Regulation S: The Safe Harbor For Offshore Securities
Transactions, 58 C.P.S., at A-I through A-11, A-17 through A-20 (BNA 1991) (1990) (containing
detailed descriptions of Regulation S); Berger, Offshore Distribution of Securities: The Impact of
Regulation S, 3 TRANSNAT'L LAW. 575 (1990) (containing detailed descriptions of Regulation S);
Berkeley & Minarick, New Regulation S: Offshore Offerings, in PRAC. L INST., ADV. SEC. L.
WORKSHOP, 99 (1990) (outlining Regulation S); Cooper, supra note 100, at 370-82; Jakes, Foreign
Offerings Under Regulation S, in PRAc. L. INsT., SEC. FILINGS, 1990 REV. AND UPDATE, 221 (1990).
See also BLOOMErmA., 3C SECURITMES AND FEDERAL CORPORATE LAw § 15.12 (1991)
(comprehensive analysis of Regulation S); JOHNSON, supra note 100, at 469-73 (describing
applicability of Regulation S to debt offerings); Krohn, Offerings Out of Bounds: Safe Harbors Under
the SEC's New Regulation S, 4 PROBATE & PROPERTY, Sept./Oct. 1990, at 6, 10 (Regulation S "no
panacea" for developees and portfolio managers in quest for foreign capital); Pertell, Kiernan &
Sommer, supra note 3, at 13 (Supp.), 17-21.
172. Registration of Foreign Offerings by Domestic Issuers, Sec. Act Release No. 33-4708, 1
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCII) 1361-63 (July 9, 1964).
173. Procedures involved lock-up agreements among underwriters and dealers prohibiting sales
to such persons. See Belier & Berney, Eurobonds, 19 REv. SEC. & COMM. REG. 39, 42-48 (1986)
(includes discussion of U.S. sales restrictions concerning initial distributions of warrants, and
secondary tracking and convertible securities). See generally Evans, Offerings of Securities Solely to
Foreign Investors, 40 Bus. LAw. 69 (1989) (discussing, inter alia, lock-up procedures approved in
SEC no-action letters).
188
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offered and sold only to non-U.S. nationals and not distributed or
redistributed in the United States. 174 In contrast to the prior
non-U.S. national regime, under the "territorial approach"'1 75 of
Regulation S, offers and sales of securities which occur "offshore"
from the United States are not subject to section 5.176
Additionally, Regulation S contains two non-exclusive safe harbors
from registration: an issuer safe harbor'" for offers and sales by
issuers, securities professionals, and their affiliates and a resale safe
harbor178 for resales by all other persons. The availability of both
safe harbors is conditioned on the existence of "offshore
transactions '  and the absence of "directed selling efforts" 180
in the United States.' 8' While Regulation S narrows the scope of
section 5's registration requirements, the Commission has
reaffirmed the greater reach of the federal securities anti-fraud
provisions.18
174. Because a security's domestic market is usually the primary market, the concern is that
unregistered securities distributed offshore by U.S. issuers will flow back into the United States. SEC
STUDY, supra note 3, at H-54.
175. Regulation S Adopting Release, supra note 171, at 80,665.
176. Rule 901 ("General Statement"); Rule 902(i) ("Offshore Transaction").
177. Rule 903.
178. Rule 904.
179. An "offshore transaction" is one in which the offer is not made to a person in the United
States. Rule 9020); Regulation S Adopting Release, supra note 171, at 80, 666-68. In order to be
defined as an offshore transaction, either the offer must be made to a purchaser which is outside the
United States when the buy order originates or the transaction must be carried out on a designated
offshore securities market. let
180. "Directed selling efforts" are activities which are calculated or could reasonably be
expected to condition the market for the Regulation S offerings. Rule 902(b); Regulation S Adopting
Release, supra note 171, at 80,668-71. Such efforts include marketing activities in the United States
calculated to induce the purchase of securities ostensibly being offered and sold outside the U.S. Rule
902(b). Id. See infra notes 191-96 and accompanying text (describing directed selling efforts). See
also McLaughlin, "Directed Selling Efforts" Under Regulation S and the U.S. Securities Analyst,
24 REv. OF SEC. & COMM. REG. 117, 122 (1991) (stating that Regulation S should be broadly
construed so that "normal" distribution of research material in the U.S., comparable to that allowed
during domestic public offerings, during Regulation S offerings should not be deemed to be
prohibited "directed selling efforts").
181. Rule 903(a),(b); Rule 904(a),(b).
182. According to the Commission, Regulation S does not limit the extra-territorial application
of federal anti-fraud provisions, as articulated by the courts pursuant to the "conduct" and "effects"
tests. Preliminary Notes 1 and 2 to Regulation S; Regulation S Adopting Release, supra note 171,
at 80,665. The conduct and effects tests have their origins in RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN
RELATIONS LAW OF U.S. (1965). See IT v. Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001, 1018 (2d Cir. 1975)
(applying conduct test); Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., 519 F.2d 974, 990 (2d Cir. 1975), cert
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The General Statement183 of Regulation S provides that offers
and sales occurring outside the United States are not subject to
Securities Act registration, whether or not they fall within the safe
harbors."' Determinations that transactions are exempt under
Rule 901 are made on the facts and circumstances of each
case. 
185
The safe harbors of Regulation S are set forth in Rules 903 and
904, and permit registration-free distributions and secondary
resales, respectively. Under the Rule 903 issuer safe harbor, offers
and sales made by the issuers, underwriters, dealers, or other
participants in the distribution (distributors)186 are considered to
be made outside the United States.1 While distributors may
engage in resales of securities of the same class as those being
distributed, under Rule 904 distributors are prohibited from
reselling the securities which are the subject of the offering until
the distribution has ended, their allotments have been sold, and any
applicable restricted period"88 has expired.18 9 Resales under the
denied, 423 U.S. 1018 (1975) (discussing bases for distinguishing between scope of disclosure and
antifraud provisions); Schoenbaum v. Firstbook, 405 F.2d 200, rev'd. on other grounds, 405 F.2d
215, 2220 (2d Cir. 1968) (en band), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 906 (1969) (applying effects test). See
Goelzer, Mills, Gresham & Sullivan, The Role of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission in
Transnational Acquisitions, 22 INT'L L 615, 620, 641 (1988) (noting that U.S. jurisdiction is more
likely to be invoked in cases involving fraud than in matters concerning registration provisions;
asserting that integration of world securities markets and international currency fluctuations will lead
to regulatory conflicts resulting from differences in scope of U.S. and foreign jurisdiction and
substantive law). Compare Note, Restricting the Jurisdiction ofAmerican Courts Over Transnational
Securities Fraud, 79 GEo. LJ. 141, 148-61, 169-71 (1990) (critically reviewing inconsistent
application of conduct and effects test; arguing for restrained use of effects test as consonant with
protection of U.S. investors, markets, and national political interests in global market setting).
Regulation S is a safe harbor from federal registration of securities offerings. It does not limit the
application of state securities laws, some of which may impose registration requirements on offshore
transactions which comply with Regulation S. Preliminary Note 4 to Regulation S; Regulation S
Adopting Release, supra note 171, at 80,665.
183. Rule 901.
184. d; Regulation S Adopting Release, supra note 171, at 80,66566.
185. Regulation S Adopting Release, supra note 171, at 80,665-66.
186. Rule 902(c). Rule 902(c) defines as a "'distributor" any underwriter, dealer, or other
person participating in the distribution of securities offered or sold in reliance on Regulation S. Id
187. Rule 903(a)-(c).
188. Rule 902(m) ("Restricted Period").
189. Rule 904.
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Rule 904 safe harbor may be made by persons unaffiliated with or
not acting on behalf of issuers or distributors, and are deemed to
occur outside the United States.190
A. General Conditions -- Offshore Transactions; No Directed
Selling Efforts
As noted above, transactions under Rules 903 and 904 must be
offshore and not be the subject of directed selling efforts. In an
offshore transaction, no offer or sale may be made to a person in
the United States.191 Further, either the buy order must be
originated when the buyer is or the seller reasonably believes the
buyer to be outside the U.S. or, regardless of the location of the
person originating the buy order, the transaction must not be
prearranged and must be executed through a designated offshore
securities market."19 Also, for the issuer safe harbor to be
available, neither the issuer nor any distributor, affiliate, or agent
may engage in directed selling efforts in the United States.193
Similarly, the resale safe harbor is available only if the seller, its
affiliates, and agents refrain from directed selling efforts in the
United States. Directed selling efforts are activities within or
outside the United States which could reasonably be expected to
result in conditioning the market for the securities being offered in
reliance on Regulation S.194 Such activities can include
190. 1&
191. Rule 902(i).
192. Issuer offshore transactions must be executed on a foreign securities exchange. Rule
902(ii)(B)(1). Offshore resale transactions must be executed through a designated offshore securities
market. Rule 902(ii)(B)(2); Rule 902(a) ("Designated Offshore Securities Market") identifies
seventeen foreign markets. The Commission staff has designated additional markets subsequent to
the adoption of Regulation S. See Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, [1990
Transfer Binder] Fed. See. L. Rep. (CCH) 179,498 (July 7, 1990) (Helsinki Stock Exchange); The
First Boston Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, [1990 Transfer Binder] Fed. See. L. Rep. 79,462 (June
14, 1990) (Stock Exchange Automated Quotation International (SEAQ), part of International Stock
Exchange (1SE) of the United Kingdom and Republic of Ireland Limited).
193. Rule 903(b).
194. Rule 902(b)(1).
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distribution or publication within the United States of print and
broadcast advertising, recommendations, opinions, 195  and
broker-dealer quotations.196
B. Issuer Safe Harbor
1. Category 1: Foreign Issuers with No Substantial U.S. Market
Interest, Overseas Directed Offerings, and Foreign Government
Offerings
The Rule 903 safe harbor distinguishes among three
categories 97 of securities on the basis of nationality, Exchange
Act reporting status, and the degree of U.S. market interest in the
security.'98 Category 1 is set forth in Rule 903(c)(1) and is
available for the following securities: (1) Foreign issuer offerings
for which there is no substantial U.S. market interest (SUS1I;'
(2) overseas directed offerings;2" (3) offerings backed by the full
195. Advertisements concerning offerings are prohibited from appearing in publications having
a "'general circulation" in the United States. 902(b),(k); Rule 903(b). A "general circulation"
publication is defined as one printed primarily for distribution in the U.S. or which has had an
average circulation during the previous 12 months of 15,000 or more copies per issue in the United
States. Rule 902(k)(1),(2). Where a foreign publication produces a separate U.S. edition that has a
general circulation in the U.S., only the U.S. edition will be deemed to be a general circulation
publication if the non-U.S. editions do not qualify as general circulation publications when the U.S.
edition is disregarded. Id. Certain tombstone advertisements in publications with limited U.S. and
non-U.S. aggregate circulations are excluded from the definition of directed selling efforts. Rule
902(b); Regulation S Adopting Release, supra note 171, at 80,668-71. See McLaughlin, supra note
180, at 122 (arguing that "normal" distribution of research material should not be construed as
constituted directed selling efforts).
196. Quotations on PORTAL, see supra notes 160-70 and accompanying text, are not
considered to be directed selling efforts under Regulation S. Regulation S Adopting Release, supra
note 171, at 80,671 n.71.
197. Each category is subsequently referred to in the text as a separate safe harbor although
they are all classes of the Rule 903 issuer safe harbor.
198. With respect to a subsidiary's debt securities which are fully and unconditionally
guaranteed by the parent, the ultimate parent's status under Regulation S governs for the purposes
of determining which issuer safe harbor is available. Rule 903(c)(5).
199. SUSMI is defined in Rule 902(n). See infra notes 209-13 and accompanying text
(discussing SUSMI).
200. An overseas directed offering is defined in Rule 902(j) and includes foreign issuer
offerings targeted at a single country and U.S. issuer offerings of non-convertible debt securities,
ABSs, and non-participating preferred stock denominated in a foreign currency and directed at a
single foreign country. Rule 9020). See Rule 903 (c)(4)(i),(ii) ("Non-Participating Preferred Stock and
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faith and credit of a foreign government;2"' and (4) securities
issued in connection with certain employee benefit plans.2 2
Offers and sales of securities within the Category 1 safe harbor are
not subject to any limitations,2 3 save that they be made offshore
and not be the subject of directed selling efforts in the United
States. 204 The intent underlying Regulation S, as with Release
4708,205 is to minimize flowback into U.S. markets of securities
initially sold abroad.20 6 In the SEC's view none of the
aforementioned offerings are likely to result in significant
flowback 207 Among those singled out by the Commission as low
risks in this regard are United States asset-backed issues directed
at a single foreign jurisdiction.0 8
SUSMI in an issuer's debt securities is calculated by
aggregating its "traditional" debt securities, non-participating
preferred stock, and. asset-backed securities.09 An ABS is defined
alternately as an ownership interest or certificate of participation in
a pool of specified assets or a security, secured by assets or
certificates of participation in such assets, the principal and interest
Asset-Backed Securities").
201. Rule 903(c)(1)(iii).
202. Rule 903(c)(1)(iv).
203. For example, a U.S. person overseas at the time of the offering could purchase Category
I securities.
204. Rule 903(a),(b).
205. See supra notes 172-74 and accompanying text. In release 4708, the SEC announced that
it would not pursue enforcement action for failure to register public offerings in cases where
securities were distributed overseas exclusively to foreign nationals in a manner designed to result
in the securities "coming to rest aboard." I Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1361-63 (1964). See supra
note 173 and accompanying text (for sources describing practice under Release 4708).
206. Regulation S Adopting Release, supra note 171, at 80671.
207. Id. at 80,672.
208. See supra note 200 and accompanying text. Regulation S Adopting Release, supra note
171, at 80,672.
209. Rule 902(n)(3). SUSMI in non-participating preferred stock and ABSs is determined on
the same basis as debt securities. Rule 903(c)(1)(i)(B); Rule 903(c)(4)(ii); Regulation S Adopting
Release, supra note 171, at 80,673-74. Rule 902(n)(1) defines SUSMI with regard to equity
securities. SUSII in a class of equity securities exists where, either at the commencement of the
offering the securities traded publicly in U.S. markets comprised the largest market for the security,
or at least 20% of the trading in the security occurred through U.S. trading facilities and less than
55% of the trading occurred through the facilities of an exchange of a single foreign country. Rule
902(n)(1). SUSMI in warrants is determined by the degree of market interest in the underlying
securities at the time of exercise. Rule 903(c)(1)(i)(C).
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of which is payable in relation to payments or reasonable
projections of payments on specified assets or certificates of
participation in a pool of specified assets.210 SUSMI is
determined at the commencement of the offering and is deemed to
exist where all the issuers' debt securities are held by 300 or more
U.S. persons,2" and a minimum of both $1 billion and twenty
percent of the principal amount of such debt is held by U.S.
persons.212 SUSMI in asset-backed securities is determined using
the debt securities definition.21
3
Overseas directed offerings (ODOs) are offerings to residents
of a single country other than the U.S. by foreign issuers or
domestic issuers of non-convertible debt and ABSs denominated in
non-U.S. dollar convertible foreign currency.214
2. Category 2: Securities of Reporting Issuers; Debt,
Asset-Backed and Non-Participating Preferred Securities of
Non-Reporting Foreign Issuers
The Category 2 safe harbor is available for reporting U.S.
issuers, all foreign reporting issuers with SUSMI, and foreign
issuers' debt, non-participating preferred stock, and ABSs.
215
Category 2 securities are subject to the General Conditions of
Regulation S, 216 as well as specified offering and transaction
210. Rule 903(c)(4)(ii). An ownership interest in an ABS includes servicing rights, and the
receipt or right to receive timely payments pursuant to the terms of the security. Ud. "Assets" include
securities, installment sales, accounts receivable, notes, leases, contracts and other assets which by
their terms convert to cash over finite periods of time. Id.
211. Rule 902(n)(2)(i); Rule 903(c)(4)(i),(ii). SUSMI is calculated on the basis of the total debt
securities of the issuer, including securities of a different class than those being offered. Id
212. Rule 902(n)(2). Commercial paper exempt from registration under Section 3(a)(3) of the
Securities Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(3) (1988), is excluded from the determination of SUSMI in an
issuer's debt securities. Rule 902(n)(3); Regulation S Adopting Release, supra note 171, at 80,674
n. 920.
213. Rule 903(c)(1)(i)(B); Rule 903(c)(4)(ii).
214. Rule 9020); Rule 903(c)(1)(i),(ii).
215. Rule 903(c)(1)(i). Rule 902(1) excludes from the definition of reporting issuers thos-e
foreign issuers filing information with the SEC pursuant to Rule 12g3-2(b) of the Exchange Act, 17
C.F.R. § 240.12g3-2(b) (1990); Rule 9020).
216. Rule 903(c)(2).
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restrictions on issuers217 and certain other persons and transaction
restrictions2 on investors.
The transaction restrictions of Rule 903(c)(2) prohibit Category
2 securities from being offered or sold to U.S. persons219 until
after the expiration of a forty-day "restricted period,"'  which
is generally the period at the conclusion of which the securities are
deemed to have come to rest in the hands of non-U.S. persons.221
Issuers and distributors22 must ascertain that purchasers are
non-U.S. persons.' With respect to natural persons, status as a
U.S. person is determined principally on the basis of residency
within the United States. 4 An entity's status is generally
determined on the basis of jurisdiction of the organization.'
Fiduciaries with investment discretion are considered purchasers,
and their location or organization in the U.S. is generally
determinative." An exception exists for U.S. professional
fiduciaries such as broker-dealers, which exercise investment
217. See Rule 903(c)(3) (specifying additional restrictions on issuers).
218. Rule 903(c)(2)-(3).
219. The Regulation S definition of -U.S. person" relates to purchasers of securities, not
issuers. With respect to natural persons, U.S. residency, not citizenship, determines status as a U.S.
person. Rule 902(o)(1)(i). Trusts and estates are U.S. persons if any trustee or executor is a U.S.
person, except that such entities are not U.S. persons if an executor, administrator, or trustee which
is not a U.S. person has sole or shared investment discretion and if certain additional factors are
present. Rule 902(o)(I)(iii) (relating to estates); Rule 902(o)(l)(iv) (relating to trusts). Entities
organized under U.S. laws are U.S. persons. Rule 902(o)(1)ii). Branches or agencies of U.S. entities
located abroad are generally U.S. persons, and U.S. branches or agencies of foreign entities are U.S.
persons. Rule 902(o)(1)(ii). A U.S. entity which organizes an entity under foreign law specifically
for the purpose of purchasing unregistered securities is not a U.S. person if organized and owned by
accredited investors (as defined in Regulation D, 17 C.F.R. § 230.501(a) (1990)) which are not
natural persons, trusts, or estates. Rule 902(o) (1)(viii). U.S. professional fiduciaries with discretionary
control over the accounts ofnon-U.S. persons are not deemed to be U.S. persons. Rule 902(o)(2). The
definition of directed selling efforts excludes contacts with such fiduciaries. Rule 902(b)(3). Offers
and sales to them are considered to be made offshore. Rule 902(1)(3). See generally Regulation S
Adopting Release, supra note 171, at 80,676-77 (discussing definition of U.S. person).
220. "'Restricted period" is defined in Rule 902(m).
221. Rule 903(c)(2).
222. Rule 902(c) defines distributor as any underwriter, dealer, or other person which, pursuant
to a contract, participates in the distribution of securities being offered or sold in reliance on
Regulation S. Rule 902(c).
223. Rule 903(c)C1)(iv)(c).
224. See supra note 219 (Regulation S definition of U.S. person).
225. Rule 902(o)(l)(ii).
226. Rule 902(o)(1)(vi),(vii).
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discretion over the accounts of non-U.S. persons. Such fiduciaries
are deemed to be non-U.S. persons.' Offers and sales to U.S.
professional fiduciaries are considered to be offshore and not to
have been the result of directed selling efforts in the United
States.228
The forty-day restricted period commences upon the closing
date or the date of the first offer to a non-distributor, whichever is
later.229 With respect to multiclass continuous non-convertible
debt offerings -- a common asset-backed structure -- a restricted
period applies to each tranche.? A tranche's restricted period
begins .on the date the lead underwriter certifies that the distribution
of that tranche has been completed.231 During the restricted
period, the distributor selling the securities must inform
distributors, dealers, and other persons receiving compensation in
connection with the securities, by confirmation or similar method,
that they are subject to the same offer and sale restrictions as the
selling distributor. 2
Category 2 offering restrictions apply to the issuer, all
distributors, affiliates, and agents. 3  The restrictions focus on
excluding U.S. persons from offers and sales during the restricted
period. Distributors must agree in writing to abide by Regulation
S and must specifically assure that all offering materials and
advertisements disclose that the securities are restricted.2I
227. Rule 902(o)(2).
228. See supra notes 193-96 and accompanying text (discussing directed selling efforts).
229. Rule 902(m).
230. I&
231. Id. The restricted period for continuous offerings commences when the lead underwriter
certifies that the distribution has been completed. Id. The restricted period for warrants commences
after they have been distributed, provided that they have restrictive legends, that there are written
certifications from persons exercising the warrants, and that there are procedures to prevent their
exercise in the United States. Id.; Regulation S Adopting Release, supra note 171, at 80,677-78.
232. Rule 903(c)(2)(iv). Category 3 securities are subject to the same requirement. Rule
903(c)(3)(iv). See infra notes 235-43 and accompanying text (discussing Category 3 securities).
233. Rule 902(c); Rule 903(c)(2)(ii)-(iv).
234. See Rule 902(h) (defiming "Offering Restrictions").
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3. Category 3: Non-Reporting U.S. Issuers; Certain Equity
Securities of Foreign Issuers
Category 3 is the most restrictive safe harbor. It is available for
non-reporting U.S. issuers and equity offerings of non-reporting
foreign issuers with SUSMI, and is generally available to any
issuer.235 Category 3 issuers are subject to the General Conditions
of Regulation S" as well as the offering restrictions referred to
above. 7 However, due to the non-reporting status and lesser
availability of information about such issuers, the transactional
restrictions applicable to Category 3 issuers are more stringent'than
those applicable to Category 2. The more stringent restrictions were
imposed because of the increased potential harm to U.S. investors
resulting from the flowback of the securities of Category 3
issuers."8 Category 3 restricted periods for equity and debt are
one year and forty days, respectivelyY 9  Non-convertible,
non-participating preferred stock and ABSs are subject to the
forty-day restricted period for debt.2" During the forty-day
restricted period, debt securities may not be sold to U.S.
persons.24 Debt securities are represented by a temporary global
certificate and are exchangeable for definitive securities at the
expiration of the period. At such time, purchasers are required to
certify that they are not U.S. persons or that the purchase was
exempt from registration.242  During the restricted period,
distributors are required to notify purchasers that they are subject
to the distributor's offer and sale restrictions.243
235. Rule 903(c)(3).
236. Rule 901; Rule 903(c)(3).
237. See supra notes 233-34 and accompanying text (describing offering restrictions on
Category 2 securities).
238. Regulation S Adopting Release, supra note 171, at 80,679-80.
239. Rule 903(c)(3)(ii) (relating to debt); Rule 903(c)(3)(iii)(A) (relating to equity).
240. Rule 903(c)(4).
241. Rule 903(c)(3)(ii)CA).
242. Rule 903(c)(3)(ii)(B). Purchasers of equity securities are required to attest to their status
as non-U.S. persons, agree not to transfer the securities during the one year restricted period, and
agree to resell only in compliance with Regulation S. Rule 903()(3)(iii). U.S. equity issuers must
restrictively legend the securities and otherwise limit their transfer. Ia
243. Rule 903(c)(3)(iv).
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C. Resale Safe Harbor
The resale safe harbor provided by Rule 904 may be relied on
by persons other than the issuer, distributors, affiliates or their
agents.2' Generally, persons relying on the Rule 904 safe harbor
may resell restricted securities, whether acquired pursuant to
Regulation S or any exemption from registration, subject only to
the General Conditions. 245 Offers and sales, including transactions
on a designated foreign securities market not prearranged with a
U.S. person, must be conducted offshore and not be the subject of
directed selling efforts in the United States. 246 Securities
professionals, such as dealers and persons receiving compensation
in connection with the transaction, may resell subject to the
General Conditions,247 but in the event the securities are not
Category 1 securities and are sold during the restricted period, the
seller may not knowingly sell to U.S. persons and must notify
dealer-purchasers of resale restrictions.248
Failure to comply with either the offering restrictions or the
prohibition against directed selling efforts by an issuer, distributor,
affiliate, or their agent renders the Rule 903 issuer safe harbor
unavailable for all persons.2 ' Non-compliance with any other
requirement renders the safe harbor unavailable only for the
non-complying party." The Rule 904 resale safe harbor
generally remains available to the seller notwithstanding the actions
of third parties not acting on the seller's behalfYt
244. Rule 904. Officers and directors of the issuer and distributors who do not receive selling
compensation, other than the usual broker's commission, or act as sales conduits in connection with
the offering are permitted to resell in reliance on Regulation S. Rule 904(c)(2).
245. Regulation S Adopting Release, supra note 171, at 80,680 n.137. See Bogle & Gates, SEC
No-Action Letter, [1990 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 79,489 (July 3, 1990) (directed
selling efforts in U.S. by issuer or distributor will not bar reliance by officers and directors on resale
safe harbor, subject to Rule 904 condition).
246. Rule 904; Regulation S Adopting Release, supra note 171, at 80, 680.
247. Rule 901.
248. Rule 904(c)(1)(ii).
249. Regulation S Adopting Release, supra note 171, at 80,681.
250. l
251. Id.
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Regulation S is non-exclusive and does not affect the
availability of other applicable registration exemptions. 2
Regulation S offerings will not be integrated with contemporaneous
registered or domestic exempt offerings." Offshore resales of
restricted securities pursuant to Rule 144A are considered to be
consistent with Rule 904."4 With respect to Regulation S, the
Commission has adhered to the position taken in Release 4708 that
debt securities offered and sold offshore in compliance with Rules
903 or 904 need not be issued under a qualified trust indenture. 5
With respect to the Investment Company Act, Regulation S is
presently available only to registered closed-end funds5 6 and
investmeqt companies not required to be registered under the
Act.25 7
V. RULE 144A, REGULATION S AN)
ASSET-BACKED SECURITIES
A. Expanding Markets and Impact on Structure
One of the collateral effects of Rule 144A may be to stimulate
further experimentation in securitization, particularly in the less
mature, non-real estate related segments of the ABS markets. As
discussed above, Rule 144A permits the resale of restricted
securities of a class not publicly traded in the United States to large
252. Preliminary Note 5 to Regulation S; Regulation S Adopting Release, supra note 171, at
80,681. Regulation S does not affect the availability of Securities Act §§ 4(1) and 4(3) of the
Securities Act. Regulation S Adopting Release, supra note 171, at 80,680 n.137.
253. Regulation S Adopting Release, supra note 171, at 80,681.
254. Regulation S Adopting Release, supra note 171, at 80,681-82. See Preliminary Note 7 to
Regulation D, 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.501-508 (1991) (providing that offshore Regulation S offers and
sales do not affect availability of Regulation D for domestic offers and sales).
255. Regulation S Adopting Release, supra note 171, at 80,682. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77aaa-bbbb
(1988) (Trust Indenture Act of 1939).
256. Preliminary Note 8 to Regulation S. The SEC is seeking comment on whether and under
what circumstances Regulation S should be available to open-end investment companies. Regulation
S Adopting Release, supra note 171, at 80,683.
257. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-7 (1988).
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institutional investors."5 Rather than being viewed as an attempt
to increase the liquidity of the U.S. secondary market for
unregistered securities, Rule 144A is better seen as an effort to
establish a new third market in addition to the public retail and
private (negotiated transaction) markets. 9  It is in this
quasi-public market as potentially delimited by Rule 144A,
especially as its parameters are relaxed, that ABSs may undergo
significant changes.
Of central importance to the growth of the Rule 144A debt
market is the development of standardized private placement
documentation and covenants similar to those included in U.S.
public debt and Euromarket issues.2 60 Standardization w'ill likely
mean diminished covenant protection and increased reliance on
rating agencies to monitor covenant compliance.261 Unless and
until such developments narrow the spread of Rule 144A debt over
registered offerings so that issuers' cost of funds is comparable to
that of public financings, U.S. and foreign Exchange Act reporting
firms will have little incentive to boost the liquidity of the Rule
144A market by offering otherwise qualified (non-fungible) debt
privately in the United States. Further, the traditional strategy of
insurance companies, which account for virtually all private
258. According to the SEC's estimate, in excess of 4,000 institutions meet the qualified
institutional buyer test (minimum of $100 million invested in securities; $10 million in the case of
broker-dealers; depository institutions additionally required to have minimum net worth of $25
million). Citibank, Citibank Launches 144A Securities Effort, EURoMONEY, June 1990, at 53 (citing
SEC's estimate). See supra note 116 (discussing SEC staff approval of Standard & Poor's QIB list).
259. Citibank, supra note 258, at 53 (quoting S. Hanks, formerly chief of the SEC's Office of
International Corporation Finance and one of the architects of Rule 144A).
260. Greene & Beller, Rule 144A: Keeping the U.S. Competitive in International Financial
Marlets, 4 INsirrs: CoRP. & SEc. L. ADvisoR 3, 6, 9 (June 1990) (outlining possible covenant
structure of Rule 144A transactions). See Connolly, Positive Reaction on Rule 144A, LIFE & HFALTH
(Fin. Sevs. Ed.) (May 7, 1990), at 3 (discussing Standard & Pooe's initiating covenant ranking service
to rate private debt offerings).
261. Karol, The Effects of Rule 144A, 23 REv. OF SEc. & COMM. REo. 125, 132 (1990)
(asserting that diminished covenant protection likely). Cf. Longstreth, supra note 130, at 18
(observing that investors resist curtailing due diligence despite 144A market liquidity and issuers'
credit worthiness). The antifraud implications of Rule 144A are discussed in sources cited supra note
132.
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placement purchases, has been one of "buy and hold." 262 And,
in fact, insurance firms have been attracted to restricted securities,
in the view of some, because of their higher (il)liquidity
premiums.263  Moreover, the tepid initial response to the
introduction of Rule 144A,2  while due in substantial measure to
adverse economic conditions, may also reflect resistance by some
domestic U.S. corporate borrowers and investors to standard private
offering covenants.265 Those who hold this view are unwilling to
forego the control and protection of customized documentation,
particularly in the face of what they see as private secondary
markets which had adequate liquidity prior to the advent of Rule
144A.2" Should such views be widely held by significant market
participants, the development of the Rule 144A market would be
severely retarded.
Assuming a general market interest in Rule 144A, the rule may
encourage new and different types of issuers, such as middle-
market firms with $30-$200 million in sales, to use the private
262. Brady, Evolution, Not Revolution, EUROMONEY, June 1990, at 48. See Karol, supra note
261, at 132 (asserting that Rule 144A may cause institutional investors to be more active in private
placement portfolios).
263. Brady, supra note 262, at 58. Although Rule 144A is not itself an exemption from
registration requirements, with respect to the relative issuer cost - interest spread (differential) - of
public and private debt offerings reference to Rule 415 (shelf-registration) may nevertheless be
suggestive of Rule 144A potential cost savings. Although a number of empirical studies, see, e.g.,
Marr & Thompson, Shelf-Registration: Competition And Market Flexibility; Implications Of The
Underwriter Certification And The Implicit Insurance Hypotheses, 30 J. L. & EcON. 181 (1987), have
concluded use of shelf-registration procedures reduces issuers* cost of debt, those conclusions have
recently been challenged in a study which found that prior work did not take into account issuer
self-selection bias. When such bias is considered, shelf-registration is shown to have had no
incremental effect on lowering debt yields. Allen, Lamy & Thompson, The Shelf Registration of Debt
and Self Selection Bias, 45 J. FIN. 275, 286 (1990).
264. See sources cited supra note 161 (discussing low-level of market reaction to introduction
of Rule 144A).
265. Berkeley & Minaricksupra note 100, at 75; Feinberg, Rue 144A: "Where's The Beef?'
the Early Players Ask; Capital Ideas, CoRp. CASHFLOW MAG., Nov. 1990, at 47; Glover, Good
Intentions in a Bad Economy, Legal Times, Dec. 31, 1990, at 20, col. 1.
266. Berkeley & Minarick, supra note 100, at 75; Feinberg, supra note 265, at 47; Glover,
supra note 265, at 21, col. I (noting that issuers are reluctant to forego restrictive covenants and
legends in 144A market).
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market2i 7 for ABS offerings. Standardized documentation will
have the most immediate effect on the mature sectors of the ABS
markets: residential real estate-related, automobile loans, and credit
card receivables. These types of ABSs are becoming commoditized
in the markets, and as documentation and covenant conventions
arise, Rule 415-type shelf procedures may be developed to facilitate
offerings.'" The fact that ABS middle-market issuers may not be
well-known, highly-rated firms should not detract significantly from
the marketability of their ABSs under Rule 144A because ABSs are
often sufficiently credit-enhanced to attract investment grade
ratings. Further, in some instances, such as in the newer sectors of
the ABS markets, credit enhancement may promote document
standardization for ABS offerings which would otherwise be rated
triple-B or below, and for which standardization has not been
possible. The documentation for multi-tranche ABSs, such as
CMO-type vehicles which have been designed for specific
investors, does not lend itself to standardization. Yet the existence
of the 144A market in conjunction with proprietary trading systems
such as PORTAL should accelerate the evolution of complex ABSs
into commonplace securities, a trend which has consistently
characterized several sectors of the ABS markets since their
respective inceptions.
With regard to investors, Rule 144A may attract into the private
secondary market new investors such as investment companies,
which are active in managing their portfolios.269 Liquidity
premiums notwithstanding, the rule may also induce traditional
267. See Karol, supra note 261, at 132 (additional liquidity in private placement market created
by Rule 144A may induce middle-market fins to use such market). See also Meyers & Hein, Turn
Assets Into Cash; Securitization, CoRP. CASHFLOW MAO., Aug. 1990, at 33 (discussing appeal of
securitization to middle-market firns); Rose, Securitization: Can It Work in Middle Market?, AMi.
BANKER, Aug. 20, 1990, at I (discussing agency and portfolio diversification problems of banks in
securitizing middle-market commercial loans); T. FRANKEL, supra note 19, § 2.7 at 59-60
(speculating about possible, although distant, development of secondary market in securitized loans
of small commercial and industrial firmns).
268. Green & Belier, supra note 260, at 9.
269. See Mahoney, supra note 3, at 69 (theorizing that Rule 144A may lead to creation of two-
tier market to the detriment of individual investors; advocating that a rational response would be to
diversify by increasing investment in mutual funds which would thus be one of the -principal
unintentional beneficiaries" of the rule).
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insurance company investors to increase turnover of restricted
securities. 70
Under Rule 144A, investment companies' directors have
discretion27 ' to determine which restricted securities are illiquid
for the purposes of the SEC's ten percent limitation on funds'
investment in illiquid securities,' As a result, investment
companies will become a significantly larger market for ABSs in
light of the securities' competitive returns. In turn, demand from
new investor bases may result in creation of ABSs principal and
interest payment schedules correlated to fund-specific cash flow
and profit considerations,"' as distinguished, for example, from
insurance companies' cash flow requirements. 4 Moreover, with
respect to insurance companies, if restrictions which limit the
amount of privately placed securities in their portfolios were eased,
270. Karol, supra note 261, at 132.
271. Rule 144A Adopting Release supra note 100, at 80,647-48. Structured financings usually
involve an investment company under the Investment Company Act of 1940. Sabel & Bernstein,
Selected Legal Aspects of Structured Mortgage Financing, PRAC. L INsT., NEW FIN. INSTRUMENTs
AND TECHNIQUES, at 553, 578-83 (1990). In order to avoid registration under the Act, the effect of
which would render ABS offerings impractical, issuers structure operations so that they meet one of
the Act's exceptions from the definition of an investment company, or obtain an exemptive order
from the SEC. Id. at 578-83. For a comprehensive treatment of the Investment Company Act in
relation to ABS, see generally T. FRANKEL, supra note 19, at § 11. The SEC has recently indicated
that it may seek legislative exemption from Investment Company Act registration for those ABS
issuers, primarily non-MBS issuers, not qualifying for the Act's § 3(c)(5) exemption. SEC May Ask
Congress to Reduce Need for Funds to Seek Prior Exemptive Relief, 23 SEc. RE. & L. REP. (BNA)
830-31 (May 31, 1991). With respect to the securities law aspects of ABSs generally, the drastic
consequence of investment company classification has meant that 1940 Act issues have drawn the
most attention - including intense current scrutiny - from the investment community, regulators, and
academia.
272. Inv. Co. Act Release No. 40-5847 (Oct. 21, 1969), 35 Fed. Reg. 1,989 (Dec. 31, 1970).
In response to a recent SEC release, Inv. Co. Act of 1940 Release No. 40-17534,55 Fed. Reg. 25322
(June 21, 1990) [1990 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. I- Rep. (CCH) 1 84,607, seeking comment on
whether the Investment Company Act of 1940 should be substantially amended, the Investment
Company Institute proposed, inter alia, that the Act's restrictions be eliminated or modified with
regard to funds offered exclusively to institutional investors. ICI Urges Less Stringent Regulation Of
Funds Aimed At Institutional Investors, Daily Rep. For Executives (BNA), Oct. 9, 1990, at 7. This
would allow fund sponsors to offer products, including certain particularly high risk ABSs, to
institutions which are not appropriate for individual investors. Il
273. The small market for non-investment grade ABSs might also be enlarged by investment
companies' purchases, based on similar considerations.
274. Life insurance company cash flow requirements, for example, are more easily projected
than are the cash flow requirements of investment companies.
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insurance firms would undoubtedly increase their ABS trading. 5
Relaxation of such restrictions would be a significant impetus
toward making the 144A market a viable alternative to the public
markets2 7
6
As the 144A market matures, it may stimulate an increase in
the number of start-up ABS issuers7 which attempt to securitize
and market new species of assets. The very few such issuers which
exist to date have been shunned by the rating agencies. In future
years development stage issuers' credit-enhanced ABS offerings
may be rated, due in part to the liquidity provided by the Rule
144A market and amended Rule 144. As such, start-up issuers will
attract the interest of larger investors directly, as well as that of
investment banks seeking additional private placement revenue.278
The probability of such a scenario evolving in the private ABS
market, among others, will grow if Rule 144A is amended to lower
275. It should be noted, however, that insurance company purchases of foreign ABSs are
subject to caps on foreign investment imposed generally by states. See, e.g., N.Y. INSURANCE LAW
§ 1405(a)(7) (McKinney ed. 1985 & 1990 Supp.) (substantially restricting domestic insurers foreign
investment activities). See also PRIVATE PLACEMEmS: NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL MARKERS
114 (H. Lund, R. Sibert & P. Chamberlain ed. 1984) (discussing limitations on foreign investment).
276. Greene & Belier, supra note 260, at 9.
277. Cf Mann, Rule 144A and Venture Capital Financing, 4 INsilors: CoRP. & SEC. L
ADVisOR 24, 26-27 (Sept. 1990) (theorizing that Rule 144A may stimulate formation of new types
of venture capital partnerships meeting QIB requirements which would have an added incentive to
invest in emerging growth firms both before and after initial public offerings because of Rule 144
amendment permitting tacking of holding periods); Mills & Di Liso, How Rule 144A May Shape
Venture Capital's Future, VENTuRE CAPrrAL J. (Nov. 1990) at 12, 16-18 (Rule 144A may benefit
early stage venture capital investors at expense of later stage investors because increased liquidity
created by the rule will increase pressure on company returns; Rule 144A may lower cost of funds;
Rule's limited disclosure requirements reduce information costs and provide greater privacy for
companies' sensitive data).
278. See Dannen, supra note 37 and Tufano, supra note 93 (describing alternative views of
ABS profitability for investment banks).
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or modify the QIB $100 million threshold, 27 9 and QIB fiduciaries
are permitted to purchase securities for the accounts of
non-QIBs.28 0
B. Offshore and Distribution Considerations
Middle-market and start-up firms aside, one of the most
immediate and significant potential impacts of Rule 144A may be
in conjunction with Regulation S in making the United States a
more competitive alternative to the Euromarkets for foreign issuers.
The adoption of Rule 144A and Regulation S comes at a time
when foreign ABS markets are set for sustained growth,2 '
paralleling on a smaller scale U.S. markets in their early stages. On
the sizable assumption that the spreads between the Rule 144A
Market and Euromarkets narrow sufficiently, a substantial number
of foreign and U.S. issuers will privately place tranches of debt,
including ABSs, generally in this country, while simultaneously
conducting offshore public offerings of other tranches in reliance
on Regulation S.282 Subsequent resales of the offshore publicly-
offered securities to QIBs in the United States may be made on the
basis of Rule 144A.283 The securities of all tranches are fungible
with one another when resold offshore. Offshore resales on
279. Rule 144A as originally proposed in October 1988 would have permitted resales of
securities, under certain circumstances, to the very broad class of entities with total assets in excess
of $5 million. Proposed Rule 144A(a)(1)(iii) (Oct. 25, 1988); Rule 144A Proposing Release, supra
note 100, at 89,543. See supra notes 130-32 and accompanying text (predicting that QIB definition
likely to be amended).
280. See generally McLaughlin, Foreign Issues and Rule 144A, infra note 311, at 5, col. 1.
Longstreth, supra note 130, at 19-21 (both sources arguing, inter alia, for expansion of QIB
definition).
281. MOODY'S ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 13, at 6,20-21; Shale, Security In Big Numbers,
EUROMONEY, Mar. 1991, at 37. Query the effect of Regulation S and Rule 144A on the nascent
market for securitized third world debt. See supra note 73 (securitization of third world debt).
282. Much of the foreign debt will be represented by American Depository Receipts (ADRs)
which is frequently the preferred form of holding foreign securities. ADRs facilitate settlement of
transfers of non-U.S. securities, and conversion of dividend and interest payments into U.S. dollars.
See Citibank, supra note 258 (discussing how ADR depositories will assist in maintaining Rule 144A
resale requirements and supplying information about issuer). See generally Joyce & Jungreis, ADR
Programs Under Rule 144A: The State of the Art, 10 INT'L FIN. L REv. 32, (June 1991) (discussing
potential impact of Rule 144A on ADR market).
283. Rule 144A Adopting Release, supra note 100, at 80,681-82.
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designated offshore securities markets are made in reliance on the
Regulation S Rule 904 resale safe harbor.284
Regulation S Category 1 securities, including foreign debt with
no SUSMI and ODOs, are not subject to a resale restricted
period. 85 Category 2, which includes foreign debt with SUSMI
and U.S. Exchange Act reporting issuers' debt other than ODOs,
and Category 3, which includes non-reporting U.S. issuers' debt
other than ODOs, are subject to a forty-day restricted period during
which offers and sales cannot be made in the United States.
Dealers may not offer or sell during the restricted period to U.S.
persons in prearranged transactions." section 4(3) of the
Securities Act effectively prohibits dealers, whether or not
participating in a distribution, from offering or selling in the United
States unsold allotments of securities, as well as securities acquired
in the market, until forty days after the offering commences.28
7
Section 4(3) also limits dealers' immediate resales of all Regulation
S offerings, including Category 1 issuers.288 Nevertheless, the
ability of investment banks involved in the placement of 144A
securities to make a secondary market in such securities -- a critical
factor in creating liquidity 9 -- should not be hindered by
284. See generally Bloomenthal, The SEC and Internationalization of Capltal Markets: Herein
of Regulation S and Rule 144A - Part II, 19 DEN. J. INT'L L & POL'Y 343 (1991) (analyzing in
detail separate and joint operation of Rule 144A and Regulation S, as adopted).
285. Regulation S Adopting Release, supra note 171, at 80,672.
286. Rule 904(c)(1).
287. 15 U.S.C. § 77d(3) (1988).
288. See Silverman & Braverman, Regulation S and Other New Measures Affecting the
International Capital Markets, 23 RLv. OF SEC. & COMM. REa. 179, 184 (1990) (Category I issuers
are not subject to the Regulation S restricted period; however, such issuers may remain subject to the
§ 4(3) forty-day "seasoning period").
289. Karol, supra note 261, at 132. Commercial banks originate considerable volumes ofABSs.
The Glass-Steagall Act, 12 U.S.C. § 377 (1988), prohibits banks from directly underwriting and
dealing in securities. However, it may be expected that bank holding companies' broker-dealer
subsidiaries will deal in ABSs. Such activities may increase should the Federal Reserve Board
increase the percentage income permitted by a bank to be derived from securities activities. See
generally Fein, Banking's Opportunities In Private Placements Under SEC Rule 144A, BANKINO
EXPANSION RPTR., June 18, 1990, at 1 (noting that Federal Reserve Board's "strict position" on §
20 bank holding company private placement activities is not required by Glass-Steagall Act; stating
that subsidiaries' purchases and sales of securities as principal under Rule 144A do not constitute
distribution or underwriting pursuant to securities laws; arguing that Board's position unduly limits
subsidiaries' activities in the 144A market); Karol, New Private Placement Rule Has Diverse effects
on Banks, AMER. BANKER, May 4, 1990, at 4 (predicting bank holding company affiliates will be
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Regulation S or section 4(3). Under Regulation S, the restricted
period applicable to issuers in Categories 2 and 3 commences on
the latter of the closing date or the date the securities are first
offered to non-distributors.29 For non-continuous offerings, the
restricted period may begin before completion of the distribution
in contrast to practice under Release 4708 .291 For continuous
offerings, the period does not commence until the distribution has
been completed.2 ' However, for continuous non-convertible debt
offerings sold in multiple tranches as ABSs commonly are, each
tranche has a separate restricted period and can be released from
resale restrictions upon completion of its distribution.293 Further,
Rule 144A permits resales into the United States by dealers before
expiration of the Regulation S and section 4(3) restricted and
seasoning periods.294
As of year-end 1990, a total of thirty-seven equity and debt
issues totaling $3.7 billion had been placed with Rule 144A-eligible
institutional investors. 95 Nineteen of the issuers were foreign
entities.296  The relatively large number of foreign issuers is
attributable to the fact that they have taken advantage of the U.S.
market for initial private placement of U.S. tranches, and sold the
active 144A market participants, subject to revenue limitations). Cf McQuiston, Rule 144A,
Regulation S and Amending The Glass-Steagall Act: A New Look at Foreign Banks and Foreign
Issuers Participating In the United States Securities Market, 17 SYRACUSE L INr'L L & COM. 171
(1991) (arguing, inter alia, for modification of Rule 144A's definition of "'marketable security" to
allow foreign banks to participate as QIB's in the 144A equity market). The resolution of the debate
over the extent and manner in which banking and securities activities should be separated will
influence the impact of Rule 144A. Note, The Capital Markets in Transition, supra note 69, at 243
n.46.
290. Rule 902(m).
291. Id; Regulation S Adopting Release, supra note 171, at 80,677.
292. Rule 902(m).
293. Id. See generally Bloomenthal, Regulation Sand Offshore Distributions: Part 11, 12 SEc.
& FED. CORP. L REP. 137, 139-40 (1990) (discussing offering restrictions); Coogan & Kimbrough,
Regulation S Safe Harbors For Offshore Offers, Sales and Resales, 4 INSIoTrS: CORP. & SEC. L
ADVISOR 3, 6 (Aug. 1990) (discussing offering restriction).
294. Such resales may not include unsold dealer allotments. Resales before expiration of the
seasoning periods may also be limited by syndication agreements. See Greene & Belier, supra note
260, at 10; Silverman & Braverman, supra note 288, at 186, 188.
295. Eichenwald, Market Place; Private Placements Off To A Slow Start, N.Y. Times, Mar. 11,
1991, § D, at 10, col. 3 (citing IDD Information Services Figures).
296. Id.
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balance of their offerings publicly in their home markets in reliance
on Regulation S.297 Lack of liquidity in the developing U.S.
144A-PORTAL market does not present foreign issuers with the
same disincentives as U.S. issuers since their securities have
liquidity in their public home markets.298 U.S. issuers with no
significant offshore markets have no such advantage and must
await the maturity of the 144A market.
299
C. TEFRA
The effect of Regulation S and Rule 144A on the attractiveness
of the U.S. asset-backed primary market and U.S. offshore
secondary market trading will be significantly diminished by the
anti-bearer bond rules of the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility
Act of 1982 (TEFRA).00 In reaction to the relaxation of
securities law restrictions on debt offerings under Regulation S, the
Internal Revenue Service adopted TEFRA D.31 The TEFRA D
regulations are intended to ensure that offers and sales of
unregistered debt securities cannot be made within the United
States or to U.S. persons, wherever resident. Bearer debt issuers are
required to obtain non-U.S. status certification prior to delivery of
securities and payment of interest.? International offerings in
which the tranches issued abroad are in bearer form will therefore
not be fungible with U.S. tranches, which must be in registered
form.
303
297. Cooper, Misperceptions of a Move to Globalization, PENSIONS & INVESTIMENT AGE, Oct.
29, 1990, at 16; Eichenwald, supra note 295, § D at 10, col. 3.
298. Cooper, supra note 297, at 16.
299. Il
300. I.R.C. § 163(f) (1986).
301. Treas. Reg. § 1.163-5(c)(2),55 Fed. Reg. 19,622 (May 10, 1990). See Borisky & Liu, New
Tax Regulations Governing Debt Offerings in the International Capital Markets, 4 INStGHTS: CORP.
& Suc. L. ADVISOR 3, 3 (July 1990); Vogel, Mooney & Stone, New Securities and Tax Regulation,
19 TAX. MGT. INT'L J. 342 (1990) (BNA).
302. Treas. Reg. § 1.163-5(c)(2)(i)(D)(3) (1991).
303. Silverman & Braverman, supra note 288, at 184-85, 188. TEFRA certification is not
required for commercial paper maturing in 183 days or less. Id. at 184 n.26 Cf. Consequently, U.S.
issuers can offer, for example, 183-day asset-backed Eurocommercial paper (ECP) in bearer form.
Foreign issuers can offer ECP with maturities of under one year. Id.
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D. Further Considerations
The U.S. ABS markets will remain dominant for the foreseeable
future. Nevertheless, foreign ABSs may eventually become a
presence in the Rule 144A market.304 In 1985, foreign private
placements in the U.S. amounted to $1.4 billion.305  By 1989,
foreign private placements had increased in volume to $22.2
billion, a figure which represents thirteen percent of the total $170
billion 1989 U.S. market.' The growth of foreign placements
has been driven by the wave of acquisitions of U.S. firms by
Japanese and European companies, and the resulting need to raise
long-term debt and equity in the U.S. 3 7  Increasing foreign
presence in U.S. public and private markets is also attributable to
more restrictive bank capital standards, which have led to higher
borrowing costs, and the weakness of the United States dollar,
which has made borrowing in Eurodollar markets more
expensive.0 8
As described above, during the restricted period U.S.
broker-dealers may purchase foreign as well as U.S. public issues
offshore for immediate resale into the 144A market.309 With
304. See Parker, Securities Geared For East Europe, PENSIONS & INVESTMENT AGE, July 23,
1990, at 30 (discussing how U.S. investment banks are structuring ABSs collateralized by Eastern
European Bloc assets and issued by government agencies). See also, Structured Finance Takes Root
in Europe, EuRoMoNEY, Aug. Supp. 1989, at 11 (discussing signs that European ABS market is "on
the move."); Cf. Doty, Capitol Market Developments in Central and Eastern Europe: The SEC
Perspective, INTERNATIONAL SECURITIES MARMETS at 111 (PLU 1991).
305. Chu, The U.S. Private Placement Market for Foreign Securities, BANKER'S MAO.,
Jan./Feb. 1991, at 55.
306. Il
307. 1l at 56. While the all-in costs of foreign borrowing may be lower during certain periods,
U.S. debt markets have traditionally been attractive because of longer maturities (10-20 years) and
greater flexibility of call-protections. let at 57. Further, the U.S. private placement market provides
access to 7 to 20 year debt, depending on borrower credit standing, in contrast with the general 5-
year maximum maturities available in the Euromarket. Id Finally, the U.S. subordinated debt market
and the lending market for non-investment grade borrowers are more developed than their foreign
counterparts. Id
308. Chesler-Marsh, The Lure of the Yankee Dollar, EuRoMONEY, Jan. 1991, at 33.
309. Rule 902(o)(1)(viii). Regulation S excludes foreign branches and agencies of U.S. banks
from the definition of U.S. person. Rule 902(o)(6). Cf. Miller & Farber, Regulation of
Foreign-Broker-Dealers in the United States, 34 N.Y.L ScH. L. REv. 395 (1989) (discussing SEC's
modest relaxation of foreign broker-dealer registration requirements under new Rule 15a-6, and the
Commission's concept release concerning foreign broker-dealers' exemption from registration as
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respect to foreign issuers, one of the principal rationales for Rule
144A has been the aversion to U.S. capital markets arising from
U.S. disclosure requirements, particularly industry segment and
accounting disclosure, continuous Exchange Act reporting
obligations, and the frequency of litigation in the United States. 1
Rule 144A allows foreign issuers to avoid extensive disclosure and
section 11 and 12(1) Securities Act liability.3 11 Paragraph (d)(4)
of the rule provides that security holders and prospective
purchasers have the right to receive certain information from
non-reporting issuers upon request. Foreign issuers may
become reporting issuers for the purposes of Rule 144A by
submitting to the SEC, pursuant to Rule 12g3-2(b), information
they provide to home country security holders.313
In addition to establishing a registration-free safe harbor for
issuers' offshore distributions, Regulation S will serve as an exit
from U.S. private -- including 144A -- markets for offshore resales.
This exit function will allow, for example, unrestricted flow of
foreign issuers' securities into overseas markets where liquidity
may be greater than in the United States, and should promote more
rapid development of foreign ABS primary markets. Further, under
Regulation S, distributors are permitted to sell unseasoned
registered debt and equity in the United States directly to U.S.
fiduciaries for discretionary accounts of foreign investors.314
conditioned on similar foreign regulation and cooperation).
310. Rule 144A Proposing Release, supra note 100, at 89,533.
311. Rule 144A sales are exempt from registration. As such they are not subject to §§ 11 and
12(1) of the Securities Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77k and 771 (1) (1988), which are applicable to violations
of the Act's § 5 registration requirements. See Karol, supra note 261, at 130-32 (discussing civil and
anti-fraud liability under Rule 144A). See also Longstreth, supra note 130, at 16-18 (discussing anti-
fraud liability in connection with information supplied pursuant to Rule 144A(d)(4)). But see
McLaughlin, Foreign Issues and Rule 144A, N.Y.I., Oct. 25, 1990, 5, at 6, col. I (asserting that
many foreign issuers may be averse to the Rule 144A market because of potential Rule lOb-5 and
§ 12(2) liability associated with responding to the Rule 144A(d)(4) information requirement; arguing
that the requirement presents substantial disincentive for foreign issuers not registered under the
Exchange Act reporting or exempt under Rule 12g3-2(b) to choose U.S. over competing markets).
312. See supra notes 131-37 and accompanying text (discussing information requirements of
Rule 144A(d)(4)).
313. Rule 144A(d)(4)(i); Rule 144A Adopting Release, supra note 100, at 80,645-46.
314. Rule 902(o)(2); Regulation S Adopting Release, supra note 171, at 80,677; Silverman &
Braverman, supra note 288, at 188.
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Finally, although it remains to be clarified, distributors may also be
permitted to sell unseasoned securities to the discretionary offshore
accounts of U.S. investors, including U.S. pension funds.
3 15
E. Asset-Backed Markets and the New Regime
In the near term Rule 144A and Regulation S are likely to have
a very modest, if not marginal, effect on the liquidity of ABS
primary and secondary markets. Significant liquidity increases will
result more from the growth of asset securitization generally, as a
function of the financial climate and economic conditions.1 6
Indeed, as noted above, the weak market conditions in the United
States, persisting since the introduction of the SEC's innovations
in April 1990, have undercut the establishment of liquidity in the
144A market.317 In 1990, overall private placement volume in the
United States declined twenty-seven percent from 1989 levels. 31
As experience with Rule 144A and Regulation S accumulates
and their impact is observed, it is likely that both will be amended
considerably. Rule 144A, in particular, will be subject to pressures
to liberalize it, for example, by reintroducing some variation of the
three-tier institutional buyer concept, 319 and by permitting QIBs
fiduciaries to purchase for the discretionary accounts of
non-QIBs.320  In its present form, Rule 144A irrationally
discriminates between non-QIB accounts managed by depository
institutions on the one hand and investment companies on the
other, which may aggregate shareholders' equity investments to
315. Silverman & Braverman, supra note 288, at 186. The authors advise that 'prudent"
distributors should not offer to sell Categories 2 and 3 offerings to offshore U.S. pension fund
accounts until the issue of permissibility is settled. lMJ
316. See Hanks, supra note 100, at 350 (stating that Rule 144A may have greater potential
effect on liquidity of privately place equity because of tendency for privately placed debt to be held
to maturity and consequently perception of less need for liquidity in that debt market).
317. See Eichenwald, supra note 295, § D, at 10, col. 3; Cooper, supra note 297 (discussing
low level of activity in Rule 144A market).
318. Gillen, Private Placements Plunge 27% in 1990, Hurt By Flight To Quality, ESOPs'
Declne, BOND BUYER, Mar. 8, 1991, at 3.
319. See supra notes 100-12 and accompanying text (discussing the three-tier institutional buyer
concept).
320. See Longstreth, supra note 130, at 19-21.
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meet the QIB test and invest on behalf of non-QIB
shareholders.321 Regulation S will be targeted for restricting the
definition of-U.S. person, and expanding the concept of offshore
offers and sales. Whatever the changes, they are likely to reflect
the fact, as do the regulations themselves, that the globalization of
the securities markets and the concern over U.S. competitiveness
are obliging the SEC to make the U.S. disclosure and trading
system regulations more accessible to foreign issuers, investment
banks, and investors. 32
Despite its relative youth, asset securitization has grown
tremendously in scale over the past decade.3' Although many
types of ABSs are becoming commoditized, structured securities
are becoming increasingly complex and involve risks that have yet
to be identified and approximated in terms of appropriate levels of
credit enhancement. 324 During 1989, for example, there were
offerings involving swapped and unswapped interest-rate risk in
collateralized bond obligations, hedging instruments, limited
documentation loans supporting MBS pass-throughs, credit card
receivables offered by lower-rated retailers, more diverse,
lower-rated tranches in some ABSs, and market value-structured
securities supported by assets trading in developing secondary
markets.3' Also noteworthy were developments in the market for
partially supported commercial paper.326 Transactions have been
designed which employ a single pool of collateral to support joint
commercial paper/medium-term note offerings.327 "Conduit"
offerings have allowed issuers to pool a range of asset types from
different originators, the ABS paper to be issued under the name
of a single issuer.328
321. Id.
322. Karmel, SEC Regulation ofMultijurisdictional Offerings, 16 BROOKLYN J. INT'L L 2, 4,
8 (1990).
323. See supra notes 8-13 and accompanying text (discussing growth of asset securitization).
324. See supra notes 44-50 and accompanying text (discussing the complexity and risks of
ABSs).
325. MOODY'S ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 13, at 5.
326. Id at 9.
327. Id
328. Id
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In 1988, Standard & Poor's began rating ABSs collateralized
by junk bonds on the basis of cash flow instead of market value,
permitting a reduction in levels of credit enhancement.329 That
year also marked the beginning of active closed-end leveraged
(investment company) fund debt issues and preferred stock
offerings supported by junk and international government bonds,
and the initial securitization of home equity, boat, recreational
vehicle and non-performing loans, and municipal equipment
leases.
330
Asset-backed securities are not widely understood outside
money center finance circles, which to date have included
institutional investors and the relatively small number of issuers
and underwriters that have been involved with the securities.
33 1
As securitization becomes more prevalent, the knowledge and
experience level among participants in ABS structuring and trading
will decline in the near term. Competition among current and new
participants, including underwriters, trustees, attorneys, accounting
firms, and collateral credit enhancers, will have a negative effect
on credit standards in developing sectors of the ABS markets.
332
The problem is not increased risk as such,33 since one of the
329. STANDARD & POOR'S CORP., Asset-Backed Securitization, STANDARD & POOR'S CREDIT
REV., Mar. 1989, at 3, 9.
330. ld.
331. Indeed, even within such circles the level of investor comprehension varies. According
to one account, investor confusion of credit risk as distinguished from prepayment risk in the ABS
credit card receivables market exacerbated the downturn in that market in the first quarter of 1991.
See Chesler-Marsh, An Open And Shut Market, EUROMONEY, Apr. 1991, at 59, 60-61 (describing
allegations that rating agencies fail to adequately explain ABS risk structure to investment community
compounding investors' over-reaction to national recession).
332. MOODY'S ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 13, at 5-6; Note, The Private Investor's Action,
supra note 38, at 594-96 (noting that lowering mortgage insurance underwriting standards in late
1970's and early 1980's became a primary means of competition among underwriters). See Batte,
supra note 38, at 49 (describing due diligence problems in mortgage banking industry).
333. But see Forsyth, Tranche Warfare: In The CMO's It's The Institutions vs. Individual
Investors, BARRON's, Aug. 19, 1991 at 12 (CMO's may be the most complex and highest risk
instruments ever created; lack of CMO losses to date attributable to comparatively low level of
interest rate volatility in recent years; while CMO default risk is low, some CMO structures are so
complex that their substantial interest rate risks are incomprehensible to many institutional investors;
CMO structure does not reduce aggregate risk but rather shifts it in varying degrees to specific
tranches; high risk CMO tranches frequently marketed by uniformed brokers to similarly uniformed
retail investors; this retail sales base supports institutional market in lower risk CMO tranches).
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functions of markets is risk transference, of which ABSs are only
one of many vehicles. Rather the concern is with the
transparency" of the risk associated with new ABS products.
Asset-backed security risk structure may be classified into
general and specific categories and further into constituent
elements. The general structure of ABS risk is borne by: (1) The
asset originator, and relates to possible loss on its asset portfolio;
(2) the credit enhancer, and concerns exposure to losses exceeding
the originator's loss limits; and (3) the investor, which bears, in
addition to risk of originator and credit enhancer bankruptcy, the
risk of adverse interest rate movements and unanticipated rates of
borrower prepayments. 35
Specific ABS risk structure involves the following: Potential
fraud by participants in the securitization process, offering
financing, and servicing; legal risks resulting from the paucity of
precedence and guidance in the field of asset securitization; risks
associated with performance failure by third parties such as
servicers and credit enhancers; reduction in a security's credit
rating; risks of insufficient diversification among types and
geographic origin of ABS collateral; and potentially adverse
ramifications on the national financial system resulting from
significant asset quality or structure problems with
institutionally-held ABSs. 336
334. SEC Chairman Breton has expressed concern about the lack of information transparency
in the junk bond market He noted that the NASD's Fixed Income Prototype System (FIPS) - a
screen-based quotation and trading system for high yield and fixed income securities, which has not
been well-received by elements of the dealer community - "appears to offer [substantial]
improvement" in this regard. Letter From SEC Chairman Richard C. Breton To Senator Donald V/.
Riegle, Jr., Chairman, Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, reprinted in, Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) (Current) (Apr. 17, 1991) 84,721, 81,407.
335. Hayes, TheRisksoflnvestinginAsset-BackedSecurities, BANKERs MAo.,Nov./Dcc. 1990,
at 34-35. See generally Caouette, "Asset-Backed": Asset Securitization, All the Rage in Some
Financial Circles, Carries Special Risk for the Uninitiated, MAO. Op BANK MGMT., June 1990, at
50 (asserting that credit enhancer due diligence is the primary factor in successful asset
securitization).
336. Hayes, supra note 335, at 35-40. See Schwartz, Regulatory Issues in Connection with
Securitization of Assets, AM. BANKER, June 8, 1990, at 18A supp. (discussing application of
Glass-Steagall Act to bank and thrift securitization programs, and new federal risk-based capital and
reserve requirements); STANDARD & POOR'S CoRp, Asset-Backed Securitization, STANDARD &
POOR'S CREDrr REv., Mar. 1989, at 7-10 (discussing legal issues involved in transferring assets from
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Rule 144A and Regulation S are intended to increase market
efficiency and competitiveness at minimal added risk to U.S.
investors and financial markets. To this end, Rule 144A and
Regulation S posit decreased levels of disclosure and due diligence
which, in the case of developing segments of the ABS markets,
will lower transparency further and thereby heighten the risk of
many instruments, impede efficient pricing, and invite abuses.
If the 144A market is to become highly liquid it will not be
practical for investors to conduct due diligence activities on a scale
comparable to that of the section 4(1 1/2) negotiated transaction
market.337  Despite their potential anti-fraud liability,338
originator to issuing entity, and emerging legal concerns relative to pooling and servicing,
securitization of vehicle and auto loans, and recoveries from seller of receivables which subsequently
default); Shenker & Colletta, supra note 12, at 1414-16 (stating that new federal risk-based capital
guidelines encourage depositary institutions to sell or securitize higher risk-weighted assets); T.
FRANKEL, supra note 19, at §§ 6-14 (discussing full range of legal issues relating to securitization,
including tax, bankruptcy, commercial, banking and securities law matters).
337. See Longstreth, supra note 130, at 18-19 (discussing evolution of due diligence function
in 144A market). Recent findings concerning Rule 415 (shelf-registration) may have relevance to
broker-dealer perceptions of due diligence-related exposure in the 144A market and consequent effect
on the amount of potential issuer cost savings under the rule. See Blackwell, Marr & Spivey, Shelf-
Registration and the Reduced Due Diligence Argument, 25 J. FIN. & QUANT. ANAL. 245 (1990)
(concluding, upon the results of a study of equity offerings, that underwriters require added
"'insurance" premiums for Rule 415 offerings on the basis of perceived erosion of due diligence
opportunities; observing that this has led some issuers to opt for full-fledged registration). See also
J. AUERBACH & S. HAYEs, INVESTmENT BANKING AND DiuaENcE: WHAT PRICE DEREGULATION?
189 passim (1986) (arguing underwriters' statutory due diligence obligations have been compromised
by Rule 415 and suggesting that sector of non-"household name" Rule 415 issuer universe poses
substantial threat to investors because of current Rule 415 due diligence practice).
338. The potential liability of issuers, broker-dealers and third parties in connection with Rule
144A has been the subject of considerable concern and discussion. See, e.g., Rule 144A Adopting
Release, supra note 100, at 80,657-61 (opinion of Commissioner Fleischmann, dissenting) (criticizing
Rule 144A(d)(4)'s information requirement as exposing issuers to liability under §§ 12(2) and 17(a)
of the Securities Act, contrary to the policy implicit in rule); Greene & Belier, supra note 260, at 7-8
(arguing reliance on QIB undertakings sufficient to maintain issuer's § 4(2) exemption despite remote
resales in violation of § 5 registration provisions); Karol, supra note 261, at 130-32 (discussing
potential liability under § 10(b), Rule lOb-5, and § 12(2); asserting that § 12(2) liability may extend
to seller's misrepresentations and omissions in connection with after-market transactions); Longstreth,
supra note 130, at 16-18 (asserting that courts are unlikely to extend § 12(2) liability to issuers in
connection with resales after distribution has been competed or resales not under issuer's control and
that issuers may be liable to purchasers and sellers in secondary market transactions under Rule lOb-5
using fraud-on-the-market theory); McLaughlin, Foreign Issuers and Rule 144A, supra note 311, at
6 (lack of certainty about issuers' potential Rule 10b-5 and § 12(2) liability for investor resales and
issuer information supplied pursuant to Rule 144A(d)(4) discourage use of rule); McLaughlin, An
Issuer's Obligation Is Unclear, NAT'L L. J., Nov. 5, 1990, 16, at 18, col. 1 (asserting that an issuer
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competitive pressures on ABS issuers and broker-dealers339 may
incline them to discourage investor verification. Issuers and broker-
dealers will argue that there are practical limitations in connection
with secondary trading and will emphasize the credit-enhanced
("insured") nature of asset-backed securities and note the low
level of abuse in ABS markets to date. Also significant will be the
comfort factor afforded by the competence of U.S. rating agencies
which, with respect to foreign securities in particular, has been
questioned.m
There are likely to be issuers which award business to
broker-dealers on the basis of considerably less than optimal
dealing in "'good faith" with "'responsible" intermediaries and investors is unlikely to be liable for
improperresales; contending that restrictive resale legends are unnecessary and probably unacceptable
to purchasers of investment grade debt).
339. It has been noted that some investment bankers perceive that financial product innovation -
- despite its development costs which are not incurred by competitors with respect to their rival clone
products - ultimately results in lower costs for innovators. Tufano, supra note 93, at 234-35.
Investment bankers employ information about the investors in initial innovative deals to create
secondary trading markets in the new financial products in which they become the dominant market
makers. Id These firms then use their market positions to learn the identities of potential investors
and their investment preferences, which results in reduced search costs relative to succeeding
underwritings and market making activities. Id See Levich, Recent International Financial
Innovations: Implications for Financial Management, 1 J. INT'L FIN. MOMT. & AccT. 1 (1989)
(discussing, inter alia, significance of new fimancial instruments from issuer financial management
perspective). See also E. BLOCH, INSIE INvEsTtENr BSAKINa 10842 (1989) (describing impact
of financial innovation on capitol markets). Cf. Dannen, supra note 37, at 61-64 (observing that
commoditization of ABS products results in lower associated investment banking profit). See
generally Hu, New Financial Products, The Modem Process of Financial Innovations, And The
Puzzle ofShareholder Welfare 69 M3XAs L REV. 1273 (1991) (analyzing implications of process and
products of financial innovation for corporate law and governance).
340. See, e.g., Lewis, Too Big For Their Boots? THE BANKER, Oct. 1990, at 6 (arguing U.S.
rating agencies' competence to rate private placements, ABSs, mergers, offshore money-market funds,
privatization, insurance, and pension plans unproven); Lowenstein, Should the Rating Agencies Be
Downgraded?, EtRoMoNEY, Feb. 1990, at 34 (describing the negative view of investment banks and
institutional investors concerning the rating process, and rating agency responses). See also
Chzsler-Marsh, supra note 331, at 62 (recounting criticism of rating agencies' reports on certain ABS
issues which were prepared gratuitously, and without consultation with issuer management and
opportunity for acquisition of information not contained in prospectuses). Cf. Zonana, Are the
Watchdogs Watching? Investors Increasingly Rely on Ratings Agencies to Say What's Safe and
What's Not But Apparent Failures in the Insurance Crisis Have Left the Firms Looking Unaware,
LA. Times, July 18, 1991, § A, at 1, col. 1 (describing the failure of insurance rating agencies to
anticipate fmancial collapse of major life insurance companies).
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disclosure, as has occurred in sectors of the private markets. 341 It
has been noted, moreover, that since the adoption of Rule 144A
there have been cases of broker-dealers offering institutional
investors debt securities without an opportunity for purchasers to
investigate the issuer.342 Further, the role of broker-dealers
generally and the benefits of their due diligence activities may be
curtailed in a highly liquid 144A market. It is possible that such a
highly liquid market may stimulate the trend toward broker-dealer
disintermediation, as issuers seek to save commission expenses by
placing securities directly with investors.343
While QIBs presumably have the wherewithal to elicit
substantial disclosure -- indeed Rule 144A rests on that
presumption -- and should in the first instance bear any adverse
consequences for failing to do so, the present $100 million QIB
threshold is likely to be lowered substantially in the future. As has
been pointed out, there is no logical basis for permitting non-QIB
"accredited investors" under Regulation D to acquire securities
directly from the issuer but barring those investors from purchasing
the same securities in the 144A market.3 " Moreover the initial
failure of the 144A market to develop liquidity, while partly
attributable to unrealistic expectations, is likely to add to the
pressures to expand the "universe" of potential QIBs by lowering
the $100 million threshold requirement. The threshold may have to
be lowered to stimulate formation of what has been termed a
341. See Greene, Reproposed Rule 144A, TwENTY-FIRST ANN. INST. ON SEC. REo. 3, 15-16
(containing comments of J. Palmer, Managing Director-Capital Markets, Salomon Brothers,
concerning "dark side" of Rule 144A competitive environment arising from lax disclosure in
segments of private markets and increased broker-dealer exposure). But see McLaughlin, Foreign
Issues and Rule 144A, supra note 311, at 6 (noting that existing private placement market for
non-reporting issuers has "extensive information requirements"; contending that firms resisting
disclosure are on "weak ground").
342. Longstreth, supra note 130, at 18-19.
343. Lewis, Cutting Out the Middle Man, EUROMONEY, Feb. 1990, at 62; McGough, Money
To Burn, FIN. WORLD, June 26, 1990, at 18, 20; Milligan, Two Cheers for 144A, INsTruTrnONL
INVESTOR, July 1990, at 117, 119.
344. See, e.g., Sontag, Rule 144A Hindered by Limitations, NAT'L L. J., May 14, 1990, at 22
(quoting comments of former SEC Commissioner B. Longstreth); Hanks, supra note 100, at 341
(stating that there is a "fundamental inconsistency" between definition of "accredited investor"
under Regulation D and definition of "qualified institutional buyer" under Rule 144A).
217
Pacific Law Journal/ Vol. 23
necessary "critical mass" of investors to create liquidity.345
Relaxation of the threshold is very likely to occur should 144A
market liquidity fail to develop in an improved economic climate.
In conjunction with competitive forces, the growing liquidity of
the 144A market 6 will be a further incentive for issuers and
broker-dealers to discourage "lower tier" QIBs with less
bargaining power from performing appropriate due diligence. Such
a development would almost certainly have significant adverse
consequences in sectors of the ABS markets. Due diligence in
connection with asset-backed securities is singularly important. The
quality of the "assets" collateralizing the securities, including the
regional and national economic environments in which they will
perform, must be examined closely -- "audited" as it were -- by
technically competent persons. An in-depth assessment of collateral
enhancement devices with an emphasis on the extent of the
exposure of third-party guarantors is also vital. At present,
investors rely on rating agencies' ability to perform these functions
in connection with public issues and, to a lesser extent, in private
markets. 47 The ABS structures of the future, which will include,
for example, multiple types of assets originating in different
countries, will test agencies' competence at new orders of
magnitude. As securitization expands to encompass new types of
assets and classes of investors, the existence of a liquid 144A
345. Cooper, supra note 297, at 16; Berkeley & Minarick, supra note 100, at 75-76.
346. The use of Regulation S by U.S. issuers, in particular, should boost the development of
144A market liquidity. U.S. securities offered offshore may be resold immediately in the United
States under Rule 144A. See Cooper, supra note 297 (discussing how initial lack of 144A market
liquidity resulting in bulk of offerings directed to Rule 144A-eligible purchasers is being conducted
conjunction with Regulation S offshore public issues involving securities with existing foreign public
resale markets).
347. See Hourican, ProceduresforAnalyzing and Rating Asset-Backed Securities, AM. BANxKR,
June 8, 1990, at 20A supp. (describing ABS rating process); STANDARD & POOR'S CORP.,
Asset-Backed Securitization, STANDARD & POOR'S CREDIT REV., Mar. 1989, at 4-5 (describing rating
process). See also Note, What Standard of Care Should Govern the World's Shortest Editorials?: An
Analysis of Bond Rating Agency Liability, 75 CORN. L REv. 411,412 n.4, 424'(1990) (recounting
oft-repeated observation that rating agencies' reports are lagging, "rear-view" analyses and noting
that agencies such as Moody's and Standard & Poor's generally do not perform independent
investigations of finns and issues, but rely on public information and information supplied by fums;
observing that while ratings are "distilled, independent judgment[s] as to the credit-worthiness of a
particular issue, [they] are not... audits").
218
1991 / Asset-Backed Securities
market will encourage more non-investment grade and unrated ABS
offerings.' Given the foregoing, a significant rise in
ABS-related fraud centering on lower tier QIBs and traceable to
issuer, third-party participant, and broker-dealer malfeasance or
negligence may be expected."°
CONCLUSION
Among its varied missions, one the SEC's foremost priorities
has been to maintain, if not extend, jurisdiction to enforce the anti-
fraud provisions of U.S. securities laws. 5 As pressures from
financial market internationalization grow, Congress will eventually
be obliged to enact more relaxed disclosure standards. 351 It is
highly likely that the Commission will continue with initiatives
similar to Rule 144A and Regulation S that, once adopted, are
progressively liberalized. Despite the success of cooperative efforts
among regulators, exemplified by the SEC's memoranda of
348. But see L BRYAN, supra note 27, at 165-67 (arguing, inter alia, that FIRREA sell-off by
thrifts of junk bonds and consequent shrinkage of junk bond market makes it likely that, "for the
intermediate future," securitization of only "high quality assets" with straightforward risks will be
possible; stating that current economies of scale make it "impossible" to securitize virtually all loans
(those under $100 million) to small- and mid-sized firms).
349. See T. FRANKEL, supra note 19, § 2.1 at 29 (securitization "exposes investors to the risks
of novel untested instruments and potential fraud from new and often unregulated actors in the
process (e.g., guarantors, rating agencies, and appraisers.)") See also id. § 3.4 at 94-100 (discussing
implication of risks posed by securitization in detail). With respect to the future involvement of
commercial banks in securitization, subjecting banks' securities-related activities to market discipline
by segregating banking functions among different entities and insuring only traditional "core"
deposit/loan banking operations would reduce, although not eliminate, moral hazard-engendered fraud.
See Bryan, A Blueprint for Financial Reconstruction, 69 HARv. Bus. REV. 73, 79 (May/June 1991)
(stating that restricting "core banks" to traditional deposit taking/lending activities 'will control the
distortions that have led to self destructive practices...").
350. See Karmel, supra note 322, at 16-17 (stating that the SEC is "preoccupied" with its
antifraud jurisdiction).
351. See McLaughlin, Listing Foreign Stocks on U.S. Exchanges: Time to Confront
Reconciliation?, 24 REv. oF SEC. & COMM. REG. 91, 101 (1991) (arguing that rather than acting
primarily to ease restrictions on sale of new foreign equity in U.S., SEC should concentrate on
"disclosure-related" elements of foreign securities trading in U.S. markets, and emphasize improving
the efficiency and transparency of U.S. secondary markets by, inter alia, reevaluating requiring
reconciliation of financial data to U.S. generally accepted accounting standards (GAAP)). Cf.
McGoldrick, Does 144A Threaten the Standardization of Accounting Statements?, INSTrIUTIONAL
INVESToR, Aug. 1990, at 118 (describing speculation about whether Rule 144A's lack of U.S. GAAP
requirement may impede efforts to develop internationally recognized accounting standards).
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understanding and accords with a growing number of countries, and
the activities of IOSCO352 and others directed toward variously
"harmonizing" disclosure, accounting and capital adequacy
standards, international enforcement of securities laws will
increasingly conflict with diverse national disclosure systems.3S 3
(Countries do have a self-interest in maintaining some degree of
financial market integrity, as shown for example, by the success of
cooperative efforts to combat insider trading. 354 Nevertheless, the
deregulation being driven by competition among national capital
and trading markets entails costs as well as benefits. 355 The
international marketing of complex investment vehicles such as
asset-backed securities, as well as high yield debt and low-priced
stocks,35  in highly liquid private secondary markets will bring,
in addition to the benefits of greater diversification, an increase in
financial fraud.357  Given the projected growth of the
352. International Organization of Securities Commissions. See OTA Paper, supra note 3, at
75-78 (describing recent activities of IOSCO).
353. Disparate historical and cultural forces underlie and shape nation-states' approaches to
financial market and competition regulation. Such forces ensure that the integrity of an international
regulatory regime, assuming one is desirable, would be subject to significant stresses - indeed, very
considerable stress during national recessions. See generally Henderson, Security Markets in the
United States and Japan: Distinctive Aspects Molded by Cultura4 Socia4 Economic and Political
Differences, Globalization of Securities Markets '90, 14 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 263
(1991).
354. Grundfest, supra note 3, at 367-70.
355. See generally Hahn & Hird, The Costs and Benefits of Regulation: Review and Synthesis,
8 YALE J. REG. 233 (1990) (commenting generally on relative lack of economic research on
aggregate effect of regulation on U.S. economy, and noting in particular dearth of studies on
effectiveness of federal regulatory oversight).
356. Cf McLaughlin, An Issuers Obligation Is Unclear, supra note 338, at 19.
357. The SEC is currently considering tightening its regulation of ABS pools under te
Investment Company Act of 1940. Inv. Co. Act. Release No. 40-17534, supra note 272. See Salwen
& Mitchell, supra note 146, § C at 1. Restrictions being considered include limitations of asset pools
to investment grade debt, restrictions on substitution of assets within existing pools, and mandating
that pools be monitored by independent trustees. Id. The adoption of such proposals (compliance with
which would be necessary to avoid classification as an investment company) would work very
substantial changes in ABS markets; preempting potential abuses in the view of some, and
..crippling" the ABS industry according to others. Id. See also Shenker & Colletta, supra note 12
at 1413 rn. 229-32 (describing positions of various interests on the application of the International
Company Act to asset-backed securities). Professor Tamai Frankel has argued strongly that asset
pools (a term encompassing typical asset-backed security structures) are "investment companies"
as defined in section 3(a) of the Investment Company Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-3(a) (1988). See T.
FkANKEL, supra note 19, § 11.4-11.14 at 457-88. However much regulatory "tightening up" the
Commission does in the near term, financial market globalization is certain to continue and
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securitization phenomenon, the rise in fraud fostered by Rule 144A
will oblige Congress, for this reason among others, to reexamine
the premises of U.S. securities laws.358
In the future "effective" regulation of national financial
markets will occur as never before, in the context of "international
[market] quality competition. ' 359  Former SEC Commissioner
accelerate. Ultimately, international market forces will be decisive in shaping regulatory structures.
L. BRYAN, supra note 27, at 180-91.
358. See Mahoney, supra note 3, at 69-70 (arguing that "the entire structure of federal
securities makes sense only if viewed in connection with the paradigm of the small investor who is
imperfectly diversified and therefore in need of information about firm-specific risks: If that paradigm
vanishes, the structure would vanish with it).
359. Gnmdfest, supra note 3, at 372. Professor Grundfest notes that market "'price-quality"
competition can occur within a single national jurisdiction, and cites Rule 144A, inter alia, as an
example of a market with "different rules for investors" and "transaction characteristics." Id Such
competition entails countervailing costs. Id See Eisenbeis, Asset Securitization And
Internationalization: Themes For The Future Of The Financial Services Industry, 9 ANN. REV.
BANKiNG L. 347, 350-51 (1990) (observing that financial market globalization is making continued
maintenance of respective national regulatory structures increasingly difficult; contending that the
United States cannot create a regulatory regime saddling financial institutions operating within
country with costs in excess of those placed on institutions abroad); McLaughlin, Listing Foreign
Stocks on U.S. Exchanges: Time to Comfort Reconciliation, supra note 351, at 100-01 (noting that
many foreign issuers do not now need access to U.S. capital markets, and arguing that existing U.S.
regulatory policy is failing to assist U.S. exchanges and NASDAQ in attracting "reasonable
proportion" of "world class" foreign issuers). See also Cohen & Conroy, An Empirical Study ofthe
Effects of Rule 19c-3, 33 J. L. & EcoN. 277, at 277, 299, 302-05 (1990). The authors note Rule
19c-3, which permits stock exchange members to make off-board markets in securities - while
increasing competition in the market for securities trading services, as evidenced by a narrowing of
bid-ask spreads - may have negative effects on price discovery process and price quality. Id They
conclude that it is unclear if increased trading service competition results in a net increase to traders
of transactional efficiency, i.e., lower cost. Id at 281. Cf. P. DRUCKER, THE NEW REALITIES: IN
GOVERNMENT AND POLmcs/IN ECONOMICS AND BusINssIN SOCITY AN WORLD VIEW 117
(1989) (arguing that new "transnational" economy lacks institutions to protect it; asserting that
foremost requirement is transnational law); Administrative Conference of the United States Colloquy:
Globalization of Securities and Financial Market Regulation in the 1990's, 10 ANN. REv. BANKING
L. 345, 369-70 (1991) (quoting remarks of Honorable S. Sporkin, U.S. District Judge for the District
of Columbia and former Director, Division of Enforcement, SEC, that competition in regulation "is
usually a race to the bottom. You cannot regulate that way."); MORGAN GUARANTY TRUST Co.,
Financial Markets in Europe: Toward 1992, WORLD FIN., Sept. 9, 1988, at 6 (indicating that
principals of home country control and mutual recognition entailed in 1992 integration of European
Community likely to increase competition among states' regulatory regimes initially, leading to rising
pressures to "converge" systems); OTA Paper, supra note 3, at 71-72 (noting "strong tendency"
for securities to trade in most liquid market, generally country of origin, without regard to degree of
regulation; asserting that assumptions that least regulated market is most efficient and attractive to
investors are "dubious"); Warren, supra note 3, at 231-32 (proposing exploration of the creation of
supranational European Community regulatory agency to combat arbitrage among member states;
such an authority might serve as a model for a international regulatory body).
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Joseph Grundfest has termed the 1990's as the era in which
financial market "internationalization will revolutionize . . .
securities regulation." 3' It is suggested here that a decade hence
-- perhaps earlier -- the growth of securitization in the Rule 144A
and Regulation S trading environment may be seen in retrospect as
one of the advance elements of that revolution.
360. Grundfest, supra note 3, at 367.
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